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I. INTRODUCTION 
The evaluation of relationships between actors is an important 
preoccupation across many areas of law.
1
  The nature of such relationships 
and the extent to which they are respected under the law can give rise to 
significant legal consequences.
2
  No less so in tax law.  Relationships, 
interactions, and transactions between taxpayers and other parties are 
critical in allowing taxpayers to obtain desired tax results.
3
  
Correspondingly, where the tax law refuses to respect such relationships, 
adverse tax consequences follow.
4
 
Relationships, interactions, and transactions between players are 
nowhere more critical than in situations involving transactions deliberately 
entered into to avoid paying taxes, commonly referred to as tax shelter 
transactions.
5
  Shelter transactions represent instances of exceptionally 
 
 1. See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, Jural Relations and Their Classification, 30 YALE L.J. 
226 (1921) (presenting a theory of jural relations and of law that underlies current judicial 
reasoning); Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (mapping legal interests accompanying various jural 
interests and relations). 
 2. See, e.g., Courtney Megan Cahill, (Still) Not Fit to Be Named: Moving Beyond Race 
to Explain Why „Separate‟ Nomenclature for Gay and Straight Relationships Will Never be 
„Equal‟ 97 GEO. L.J. 1155, 1191-1205 (2009) (describing consequences of separately 
defined relationship statuses in family law); Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How 
Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257 (2009) (describing 
detrimental effects of relationships created through securitization). 
 3. See generally Comm‘r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955); Eisner v. 
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (early cases setting out income realization requirement). 
 4. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 267 (2006) (related party attribution rules); I.R.C. § 318 (2006) 
(rules for constructive ownership of stock). 
 5. In order to further discussion, this Article uses the terms ―tax shelter‖ or ―aggressive 
tax planning‖ broadly, to include transactions entered into to avoid taxes, whether they 
actually have been determined to cross the line between acceptable and unacceptable tax 
planning.  The term is not used in a statutory or technical sense to denote actual litigation 
outcomes.  Contra I.R.C. § 6700 (2006) (defining ―tax shelters‖ for the purpose of imposing 
monetary penalty); I.R.C. § 7408 (2006) (authorizing injunctions against conduct relating to 
tax shelters).  Of course, the academic literature itself evinces a lack of agreement with 
respect to even the threshold question of what a tax shelter really is.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP‘T OF 
THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS:  DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND 
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS (1999), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-
policy/library/ctswhite.pdf (setting out common characteristics of corporate tax shelters); 
Deborah H. Schenk, Foreword:  Symposium on Corporate Tax Shelters Part I, 55 TAX L. 
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aggressive relationship formation, and in many shelter transactions one 
sees taxpayers purposefully creating and entering into contracts and 
relationships with tax-exempt entities, tax-indifferent foreign entities, 
insurance companies, banks, and other entities in order to generate 
favorable tax consequences.
6
  Sometimes courts respect these purposefully 
formed relationships and transactions and sanction their tax-minimization 
endeavors.
7
  Other times, they are not given weight.
8
  In order to distinguish 
between those transactions and relationships that deserve respect and those 
that do not, tax law has developed significant doctrines that inquire into the 
―substance,‖ ―risk,‖ or ―purpose‖ of such transactions and relationships.  
These judicially originated ―anti-abuse‖ doctrines include the substance-
over-form doctrine, the sham transaction doctrine, the business purpose 
doctrine, and, perhaps most prominently, the recently codified economic 
substance doctrine.
9
 
This Article argues that the tax law‘s traditional focus on whether a 
transaction holds enough ―risk‖ or ―economic substance‖ to be respected is 
insufficient in meeting the full range of challenges presented by the 
sophisticated, interlocking, and often hidden relationships that underlie tax 
planning today.  It argues that the fundamentally relational character of tax 
planning has important impacts on the shape and outcome of tax shelter 
 
REV. 125 (2002) (comparing James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old 
“Brine” in New Bottles, 55 TAX L. REV. 135, 158-59 (2002), with David P. Hariton, 
Response to “Old „Brine‟ in New Bottles” (New Brine in Old Bottles), 55 TAX L. REV. 397, 
399 (2002) (construing Eustice, supra note 5)).  At the same time, it is clear that those 
transactions that cross the line (as well as some that come close but do not) are viewed by 
many as problematic, revenue-reducing, and unfair.  See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Ten 
Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 222 (2002) (―[T]ax planning, all tax 
planning, not just planning associated with traditional notions of shelters, produces nothing 
of value.‖).  But see Leo Katz, In Defense of Tax Shelters, 26 VA. TAX REV. 799 (2007) 
(defending tax shelters by analogy to agenda manipulation). 
 6. See cases cited infra notes 7 and 8 (examples of tax shelter cases decided by courts).  
Thus, tax shelter transactions represent the extreme end of a continuum.  While this Article 
focuses on this extreme case, much of the relational analysis set forth herein is also 
applicable to non-shelter tax transactions. 
 7. See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 2d 621 (D. Md. 
2004), aff‟d in part, rev‟d in part and remanded by 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2006) (district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the taxpayer under the sham transaction 
doctrine); United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm‘r, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(reversing tax court and holding for taxpayer); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. United States, 
90 Fed. Cl. 228 (2009) (holding that a ―lease-in, lease-out‖ transaction qualified for rental, 
interest, and transaction cost deductions). 
 8. See, e.g., ACM P‘ship v. Comm‘r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998) (determining 
partnership transaction did not have sufficient economic substance to be respected for tax 
purposes); Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 35 (2010) (concluding ―sale-in, 
lease-out‖ transaction lacked objective economic substance). 
 9. In this Article, the term ―judicial anti-abuse doctrines‖ includes the recently 
codified economic substance doctrine. 
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litigation beyond the question of whether a transaction or relationship has 
―substance.‖  In trying to understand the full range of impacts of 
relationships and interactivity between taxpayers and other parties in how 
tax shelter cases get litigated, this Article‘s normative critique and 
proposed solutions build upon the emerging body of literature that pays 
explicit attention to the relational underpinnings of tax transactions.
10
 
Given the pervasive and growing importance of relationships with 
facilitative, friendly, and accommodating third parties in tax shelter 
transactions, explicit probing of the full significance of these parties in 
determining outcomes in shelter cases has been surprisingly sparse.
11
  
There has been a good deal of commentary on the adequacy of judicially 
applied anti-abuse doctrines in addressing the tax shelter problem, and 
some of this commentary, of course, implicitly addresses the more obvious 
aspects of how relationships and transactions with third parties come into 
play in determining whether a transaction is an abusive tax shelter.
12
  
 
 10. See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in 
Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697-700 (2007) [hereinafter Lederman I] (arguing 
that substantive federal tax law can be improved by increased use of ―structural constraints‖ 
in situations where third parties have an incentive to collude with taxpayers in promoting 
noncompliance); Alex Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning Under Risk-Based Rules, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. 1181 (2008) [hereinafter Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning] (discussing 
informal agreements between taxpayers and counterparties designed to eliminate market risk 
by substituting for it a different kind of relational risk and suggesting reforms to address the 
problem of what the author calls ―relational tax planning‖); Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of 
Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 601 (2007) [hereinafter 
Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms] (addressing the unintentional tax benefits stemming from 
informal transactions based on tacit understandings between players); Jay A. Soled, Third-
Party Civil Tax Penalties and Professional Standards, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1611 (2004) 
(evaluating third-party tax penalties and professional standards and suggesting reforms that 
emphasize accountability of both third parties and tax professionals).  See also U.S. GOV‘T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-968, TAX GAP: IRS CAN IMPROVE EFFORTS TO ADDRESS 
TAX EVASION BY NETWORKS OF BUSINESSES AND RELATED ENTITIES (2010), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10968.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT ON NETWORK TAX 
EVASION] (discussing effects of networks of related entities in facilitating tax evasion). 
 11. But see sources cited supra note 10. 
 12. See, e.g., Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the 
Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939 (2005) (suggesting a new approach to 
the tax shelter problem, based on the general disallowance of noneconomic losses); 
Amandeep S. Grewal, Economic Substance and the Supreme Court, 116 TAX NOTES 969, 
970 (2007) (arguing that the lower court‘s application of the economic substance doctrine 
cannot be reconciled with Supreme Court precedent and is inconsistent with rules of 
statutory interpretation); Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic Substance?, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 389 (2010) (arguing that economic substance doctrine should be replaced by inquiry 
into congressional intent); Assaf Likhovski, The Story of Gregory: How are Tax Avoidance 
Cases Decided?, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 89-132, (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Start eds., 
2005) (using the Supreme Court‘s reasoning in the landmark tax case Gregory v. Helvering, 
293 U.S. 465 (1935), as a backdrop for discussing how courts address matters of tax 
avoidance); Charlene D. Luke, Risk, Return, and Objective Economic Substance, 27 VA. 
TAX REV. 783, 784-85 (2008) (focusing on the problems caused by the economic substance 
OEIFINALIZED_TWO_UPDATED 3/23/2011  4:43 PM 
2011] THIRD-PARTY RELATIONSHIPS IN TAX SHELTER CASES 387 
 
However, the powerful and perverting effects of third-party relationships 
on judicial applications of existing anti-abuse doctrines beyond the 
question of risk or substance have received less attention in the literature.
13
  
The failure of the tax literature to deeply explore and theorize third-party 
relationships stands in marked contrast to other areas of law, where 
relationships between legal persons have been subject to intense, even 
voyeuristic, scrutiny.
14
  This gap in the tax literature is especially 
problematic because relationships and interactions underlying sophisticated 
shelter transactions tend to be complex, non-intuitive, hidden from lay 
view, and difficult to understand. 
One possible reason for this gap is that, judicial anti-abuse doctrines 
aside, discourses that emphasize the content of our substantive tax rules as 
discrete phenomena have been privileged over discourses analyzing the 
underlying relationships and interactions between taxpayers and third 
parties that facilitate the abuse of these rules.  More public light needs to be 
shed upon the deeply transactional nature of the tax rules in order to 
remedy this imbalance so that all of the effects of transactional tax 
relationships receive scrutiny commensurate with their importance and 
commensurate with the attention received by relationships in other areas of 
law.  This Article argues that the best ways to shed such light are (1) to 
encourage explicit judicial narratives about relationships in tax planning in 
order to facilitate transparency and counteract the dominating effects of 
rules-based and sanctions-based discourses,
15
 and (2) to adequately police 
 
doctrine‘s reliance on pretax analysis and proposing new framework for testing objective 
economic substance); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory 
Interpretation: A Much Needed Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 697 (2009) 
(arguing that judicial anti-abuse tests are insufficient and putting forth a test that looks 
directly at the purposes of the relevant laws); David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of 
Anti-Tax Avoidance Doctrines, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 88 (2002) (analyzing the effects of 
the business purpose doctrine and the economic substance doctrine ―as changes to the 
marginal elasticity of taxable income‖).  Of course, the economic substance doctrine has 
now been codified in statutory form.  26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o) (West 2010). 
 13. But see supra note 10 and accompanying text (examining examples of articles in 
which these matters have been discussed). 
 14. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) 
(stating that ―[i]n a real sense, there are three partners to every civil marriage:  two willing 
spouses and an approving State . . . . While only the parties can mutually assent to marriage, 
the terms of the marriage—who may marry and what obligations, benefits, and liabilities 
attach to civil marriage—are set by the Commonwealth.‖). 
 15. ―Rules-based‖ refers to accounts that focus on the content of the substantive tax 
rules and how to prevent their abuse.  See sources cited supra note 12 and accompanying 
text (providing examples of literature discussing abuse prevention strategy utilizing broadly 
rules-based approaches).  ―Sanctions-based‖ denotes the tax literature focusing on the 
importance of disclosure, reporting, public shaming, and penalties as means to curb abusive 
tax shelter transactions.  See, e.g., Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward 
Tax Shelter Detection, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1629 (2009) (proposing that overdisclosure under 
current tax shelter disclosure law should be countered proactively by penalties and other 
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the boundaries of important judicial doctrines from the warping effects of 
aggressive relationship formation.  Accordingly, this Article offers two 
proposals designed to achieve these goals.
16
 
Part II lays a descriptive, analytical foundation for understanding the 
roles and significance of third-party relationships in tax planning.  First, it 
defines and explains the parameters of what this Article means when it 
talks about ―relationships,‖ ―transactions,‖ and ―third parties.‖  Next, it 
describes in detail some of the roles that relationships with third parties 
play in tax planning, and in particular, in tax shelter transactions.
17
  This 
description seeks to broadly emphasize the transactional-relational quality 
of tax planning for the non-tax reader; it is also an explicit attempt to raise 
consciousness about the presence of the aggressive and sophisticated, yet 
often hidden, relationships that underlie tax planning.
18
  Finally, Part II 
points to a number of ―form-friendly‖ features of tax law that have 
encouraged and facilitated increasing participation of third parties over 
time and that have made it more difficult to adequately evaluate their 
participation.
19
  Part III discusses the ultimate inadequacy of traditional 
 
means); Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law: Symbols, 
Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IOWA L. 
REV. 863 (2004) (analyzing the effects, function, and symbolism of alternative sanctions 
imposed by Congress on taxpayers who take advantage of the Internal Revenue Code); 
Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is 
Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733 (2010) [hereinafter 
Lederman II] (finding that some taxpayer information reporting laws and proposals are more 
effective than others in improving compliance). 
 16. The analysis set forth in this Article is applicable to those tax shelter cases that 
involve third parties such as lease stripping cases, equipment leasing transactions, and 
others.  See, e.g., AWG Leasing Trust v. United States, 592 F. Supp. 2d 953, 961 (N.D. 
Ohio 2008) (sale-in/lease-out transaction); CMA Consol., Inc. v. Comm‘r, T.C.M. (RIA) 
2005-16 (2005) (multiparty lease stripping transaction). 
 17. See infra Part II.A. 
 18. I am deliberately borrowing the term ―consciousness raising‖ as used in critical 
scholarship.  Part of the project of this Article is to raise consciousness about the central role 
of aggressive relationality in enabling abusive tax planning, so that such relationality gets as 
much scholarly and critical exposure as relationships in other areas of law, such as family 
law.  See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical 
Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1784-87 (2003) (discussing functions of narrative in 
critical race theory); Aaron A. Dhir, Towards a Race and Gender-Conscious Conception of 
the Firm: Canadian Corporate Governance, Law and Diversity, 35 QUEEN‘S L.J. 569, 583 
(2010) (discussing use of narrative as a ―tool of consciousness-raising‖ in the construction 
of corporate law and governance); Mae Kuykendall, No Imagination: The Marginal Role of 
Narrative in Corporate Law, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 537, 541 (2007) (concluding that using 
narrative to reform corporate law is not ―fruitful‖ because corporate law is abstract in 
nature); Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion Discourse, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1203 (2010) (―The term [consciousness raising] and the activity 
took seriously the psychological concept of repression wherein something that is hidden 
from consciousness could and should be brought to light by talking about it.‖). 
 19. See infra Part II.B. 
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analyses of ―risk‖ or ―substance‖ in evaluating the full effects of 
relationality in tax planning transactions.  First, it provides a brief summary 
of the traditional judicial doctrines commonly applied in shelter cases (such 
as the economic substance doctrine) and explains how these doctrines are, 
at their core, concerned with relationship analysis.
20
  It then demonstrates 
that while many courts do implicitly or explicitly evaluate relationships as 
part of applying these doctrines, certain features of tax law‘s development 
have, in effect, inhibited the efficacy of the traditional doctrines in 
assessing and evaluating third-party transactions and relationships.  As 
such, there remain areas in which such judicial evaluations of relationships 
can be improved, both in content and in expression.
21
  Part IV identifies 
two additional important impacts of third-party relationships and 
participation in the litigation of tax shelter transactions, namely, adverse 
impacts on transparency and observability, and obfuscatory impacts on the 
actual substantive content of judicial doctrine.  Finally, Part V sets forth 
two normative proposals to mitigate the harmful effects associated with 
third-party relationships that have been identified in this Article:  (1) 
judicial application of a rigorously implemented and clearly expressed 
―oppositional-choice‖ analysis, and (2) judicial rehabilitation of the 
business purpose doctrine from the confusion caused by increasing (and 
increasingly complex) taxpayer relationships.  The proposals set forth in 
this Article are designed (1) to encourage more consistent and accurate 
judicial determinations of when and whether to respect relationships 
between taxpayers and third parties, (2) to raise awareness about the 
importance of third parties in tax planning by encouraging explicit and 
transparent judicial and litigant narratives about such relationships, (3) to 
encourage fairer and more consistent outcomes in tax shelter litigation, and 
4) to discourage taxpayers from engaging in the aggressive formation of 
relationships that serve only to drain the fisc. 
At the core, the central issue addressed in this Article—that is, the 
question of how to identify, understand, and manage the hidden effects and 
consequences of relationship creation between legal persons, both humans 
and non-humans—is not a problem confined to tax law.  Rather, it is a 
concern that pervades many other areas of law, including bankruptcy, 
securities, family, immigration, commercial, and corporate law.
22
  The ease 
 
 20. See infra Part III.A. 
 21. See infra Parts III.B, III.C. 
 22. See, e.g., Theresa A. Gabaldon, Assumptions About Relationships Reflected in the 
Federal Securities Laws, 17 WIS. WOMEN‘S L.J. 215 (2002) (looking at the role of 
relationships in securities law); Robert A. Prentice, Stoneridge, Securities Fraud Litigation, 
and the Supreme Court, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 611 (2008) (discussing liability under Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b) of ―collateral‖ third parties that aid and abet securities fraud); 
see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (holding that a 
corporation‘s vendors and customers could not be liable as primary actors for purposes of 
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and speed with which contemporary commercial and other relationships are 
formed, with or without underlying substance, and the potentially 
detrimental effects of such relationship formation, make it a question of 
particular urgency today. 
II. THE ROLE OF RELATIONSHIPS IN TAX SHELTER CASES 
Before venturing further, it is important to define what this Article 
means in speaking about ―third parties,‖ ―relationships,‖ and 
―transactions.‖  This Article uses the term ―third parties‖ generally to mean 
persons separate from the taxpayer.
23
  What does it mean for a person to be 
―separate‖ from the taxpayer?  To take an easy baseline, the Internal 
Revenue Code (the ―Code‖) contains provisions that disallow tax 
consequences generated by certain transactions between ―related‖ parties, 
or that attribute ownership to or from one person based on a relationship 
with another person.
24
  This Article is primarily concerned with those 
relationships between parties not already explicitly covered by the Code 
attribution rules.  Loosely speaking, this means non-taxpayer parties whose 
transactional consequences have not been specifically disallowed by 
application of such related-party statutory provisions but whose 
interactions may present problems nonetheless.
25
  Of course, some such 
―third parties‖ may be ―more unrelated‖ to the taxpayer than others, and the 
boundaries between related and unrelated parties are not always entirely 
clear.  For example, if an individual taxpayer holds significant shares in a 
corporation, and that corporation does business with another corporation in 
which that individual taxpayer also holds shares, the two corporations 
would be ―third parties‖ under this Article‘s rubric, even though there is 
 
investor‘s Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b) securities fraud action, notwithstanding 
their deceptive conduct); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (U.S.A.), Inc., 
482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding Merrill Lynch not liable for aiding and abetting Enron 
by buying Nigerian barges to allow Enron to book millions in earnings and cash flow on 
Enron‘s promise to repurchase). 
 23. The term ―third party,‖ of course, begs the question of who the ―second party‖ is.  
In this Article‘s parlance, the ―second party‖ is the IRS, who the taxpayer faces in litigation.  
Non-taxpayer counterparties are hence ―third parties‖ in the sense that they are players other 
than the taxpayer and the IRS. 
 24. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 267 (2006) (denying deductions for losses from sales of property 
between certain ―related‖ persons, including siblings, parents and their children, and 
individuals and corporations more than 50% of whose stock (by value) is owned by such 
individual); I.R.C. § 318 (2006) (rules for constructive ownership of stock). 
 25. Of course, a relationship may be ―disrespected‖ for the purposes of one section of 
the I.R.C. but not for purposes of another.  Compare I.R.C. § 318 (2006), with I.R.C. § 544 
(2006) (both setting out rules for determining stock ownership).  See also Glenn E. Coven, 
The Affinity Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code: A Case Study in Nonsimplification, 45 
TENN. L. REV. 557 (1978) (studying the complexities of the attribution rules of the tax code). 
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some relationship between them.  Thus, this Article uses the term ―third 
parties‖ somewhat heuristically, rather than strictly definitionally, to denote 
the broad universe of non-taxpayer parties with whom the taxpayer 
transacts. 
This Article uses the term ―transactions‖ to refer to the discrete 
agreements and contracts entered into between the contracting parties.  
Correspondingly, it uses the term ―relationships‖ more broadly to include 
both discrete transactions (if any) and the larger relational context 
underlying such discrete transactions.  In other words, the ―relationship‖ 
between the parties includes both the actual agreements, contracts, and 
deals (if any) entered into between them as well as intangibles such as: 
 relational statuses existing outside of the transaction 
(such as ―friend,‖ ―colleague,‖ ―relative,‖ ―employer,‖ or 
―prospective client‖); 
 legal statuses existing outside of or taken on as a result of 
the transaction (such as ―ex-husband‖ and ―ex-wife,‖ 
―buyer‖ and ―seller,‖ or ―lessor and lessee‖); and 
 the ongoing responses, emotions, incentives, behaviors, 
and actions of the parties toward one another over time 
as a result of prospective, one-time or ongoing dealings. 
Thus, the concept of relationships and relationality used in this Article 
encompasses formalized legal relationships but is also supra-legal.  It 
reflects the notion that legal transactions entered into between parties 
contribute to, and are part of, the ―relationship‖ that exists between them 
but that such ―relationship‖ is more than just the sum total of the extant 
legal contracts. 
Having defined its key terminology, the remainder of this section 
describes—for the non-tax specialist but also as a deliberate reminder to the 
tax specialist—the roles and significance of third parties in tax shelter 
transactions.  First, it broadly outlines the functions performed by third 
parties in tax planning transactions and describes the evolution of such 
third-party participation.  It then describes some features of tax law that 
facilitate and encourage increasing third-party involvement, and argues that 
the growing involvement of third parties makes it all the more urgent that 
third-party relationships be scrutinized and evaluated in a systematic way 
that goes beyond current doctrine. 
A. The Roles Played by Third-Party Relationships in Shelter Cases 
It is no secret that transactions between taxpayers and third parties are 
essential in triggering tax consequences.
26
  This is true not just in shelter 
 
 26. See Comm‘r v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (setting forth the realization 
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cases but throughout tax law.
27
  In most cases, it is a transaction or 
agreement between two or more parties that leads to tax consequences.
28
  
For example, where an employee is paid a wage by her employer, it is the 
act of the employer‘s payment to the employee that triggers tax realization 
and the gross income inclusion.
29
  On the other hand, imputed income
30
 has 
not historically been subject to federal income tax.
31
  The exclusion of 
imputed income may be explained on adminstrability, compliance, or 
critical grounds;
32
 it can also be explained by the non-interactive or non-
relational character of imputed income payments, particularly as compared 
to the (taxable) treatment of barter transactions.
33
  In other words, barter 
exchanges, which are interactive transactions between two parties, are 
taxable; imputed income, which lacks this relationally generated character, 
is not.
34
  This transactional-relational character of tax law is a highly 
important feature, one that should be obvious but is often left 
 
requirement); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (giving weight to the element of 
severability for income realization). 
 27. As previously noted, abusive shelter transactions merely represent particularly 
egregious applications of such relationality. 
 28. See MARVIN CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 75 (11th ed. 2009) 
(―[B]ecause the realization requirement exists, the income tax is a tax on transactions 
instead of being a tax on income in the economic sense.‖).  But see Cesarini v. United 
States, 296 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (finding cash in a piano seven years after it was 
purchased did not require another party‘s participation to generate income). 
 29. I.R.C. § 61 (2006). 
 30. Imputed income is income that may be ―imputed‖ to a person due to her 
consumption of goods and services for which she does not receive actual payments.  
Common examples include imputed rent for the consumption of one‘s personal residence, 
and imputed service income for household chores performed. 
 31. Benjamin v. Hoey, 139 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1944) (holding that, when a stockbroker 
paid commissions into a partnership on transactions for his own account, the share of those 
commissions payable to him as a partner did not count as income); Morris v. Comm‘r, 9 
B.T.A. 1273, 1278 (1928) (holding that a taxpayer‘s imputed income from the portion of the 
building it used itself rather than renting was not subject to tax and adding that ―[i]t is 
obvious that [the farmer‘s produce is] comparable to the rental value of a private residence, 
which has never been regarded as income or as a factor in the determination of tax 
liability‖). 
 32. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1573-74 (1996) (―A 
recognition of the importance of women‘s work, regardless of the setting, would more 
accurately reflect women‘s valuable contributions to the economy.  Once formally 
recognized, society is likely to value nonmarket housework activities similarly to market 
activities, thereby entitling women to social welfare benefits that are currently tied only to 
waged labor in the market.‖). 
 33. Compare Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60 (barter income is included in gross 
income), with Morris, 9 B.T.A. 1273 and Benjamin, 139 F.2d 945.  See also supra notes 30-
31 and accompanying text; cf. Lederman I, supra note 10 (discussing roles third parties play 
in helping with ―verifiability‖ and ―enforceability‖). 
 34. Mere ―imputed income‖ has not historically been taxed, and precedent suggests it 
could not be taxed.  BURKE & FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME, at 30 (8th ed. 2007); 
see also supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
OEIFINALIZED_TWO_UPDATED 3/23/2011  4:43 PM 
2011] THIRD-PARTY RELATIONSHIPS IN TAX SHELTER CASES 393 
 
unmentioned.
35
 
The fact that, most often, it is a transaction between two separate 
persons that triggers tax consequences means that the actions and existence 
of third parties are tremendously important in generating said tax 
consequences.  This is the case both in the non-shelter context as well as in 
cases involving abusive tax planning (the role played by third parties in 
abusive tax shelter cases being simply an exceptionally aggressive 
extension of the usual role of such parties in generating tax consequences).  
Yet the discourses of tax law and tax shelter cases tend to focus on the 
substantive content of the statutory provisions allowing such transactions, 
often at the expense of scrutinizing the underlying roles of third-party 
players that allow the transactions to happen in the first place.
36
 
In fact, third parties play vital roles in generating tax consequences.
37
  
These roles can be broken down into three overlapping functions:  a 
realization function, a financing function, and a stripping/diversion 
function.  While third parties play other roles in shelter cases, these three 
roles make up the majority of the functions that third parties play.
38
 
1. The Realization (or Timing) Function 
It is well known that the realization requirement is one of the most 
central concepts in tax law.
39
  Simply put, the realization requirement, the 
 
 35. But see Lederman II, supra note 15, at 1735, 1738-39 (pointing out that asymmetric 
information between government and taxpayer is a ―core problem‖ for tax enforcement, and 
discussing the effectiveness of information reporting by third parties in narrowing the tax 
gap); Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning, supra note 10, at 1199-1201 (examining how 
individuals use ―relational tax planning‖ to avoid adverse tax consequences); Raskolnikov, 
The Cost of Norms, supra note 10, at 642 (addressing efficiency costs of informal 
arrangements in interactions between taxpayers). 
 36. For example, much of the literature concerns itself with the proper statutory 
interpretation of tax provisions in the face of abusive transactions that fit within the literal 
terms of those provisions.  E.g., Noël B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and 
Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2004); Steven Dean & Lawrence M. Solan, Tax Shelters 
and the Code: Navigating Between Text and Intent, 26 VA. TAX REV. 879 (2007); 
McCormack, supra note 12, at 703, 706-07.  But see sources cited supra note 10. 
 37. Not all shelter transactions involve the aggressive participation of third parties and 
this Article does not so claim.  For example, some avoidance transactions may take place 
between taxpayers and entities wholly owned by the taxpayers.  Such a transaction is not a 
transaction with a ―third party‖ in the same sense as a tax planning transaction with an 
unrelated actor.  See, e.g., Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940) (discussing deduction of 
loss for sale of securities to corporation wholly owned by taxpayer). 
 38. For example, the participation of third parties may also enable taxpayers to convert 
ordinary income into capital gain or vice versa, thereby performing a transformation 
function.  E.g., TSN Liquidating Corp. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Mayer v. United States, 285 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1960); Glass v. Comm‘r, 87 T.C. 1087 
(1986). 
 39. Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940) (early case delineating types of possible 
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meaning of which is hard to pin down, generally requires some kind of 
event or transaction in order to trigger the income inclusion, loss 
deductibility, or other tax consequences.
40
  It is a fundamental tenet of tax 
law that appreciation, accretion, or decline in value, without more, will not 
generally trigger tax consequences.
41
  For example, if an individual owns a 
painting purchased for $200 in 2001, and the painting increases in value to 
$2,000 in 2010, the individual will not be taxed on the $1,800 appreciation 
absent a sale, exchange, or other disposition of the painting.
42
  Such 
disposition in effect provides the ―realization‖ required in order to trigger 
the tax consequences.
43
 
Third parties are instrumental in determining the timing of the 
realization event that is required to trigger tax consequences or benefits.  In 
the above example, the individual would need to sell the painting to a buyer 
in order to trigger income inclusion in a given tax year—she can hardly sell 
the painting to herself.  The Code also contains rules that apply in various 
situations to circumscribe the tax consequences of transactions between 
certain parties considered by the tax law to be insufficiently separate from 
the taxpayer.
44
  Thus, the tax law in effect imposes an unspoken 
requirement that the taxpayer must generally transact or interact with a 
sufficiently separate ―other‖ person in order to trigger the taxable event.
45
 
This transactional or interactive function of third parties in providing 
the realization event required to trigger tax consequences is clearly 
observed in tax shelter cases.  In cases as early as the Supreme Court‘s 
1935 decision in Gregory v. Helvering, taxpayers have attempted to use 
persons ―separate‖ from themselves to enter into transactions that trigger 
favorable tax consequences.
46
  In today‘s transactions, the rather blatant use 
 
realization events); Eisner, 252 U.S. at 209, 211-12, 214 (holding that a dividend in the form 
of additional stock is not a realized gain for tax purposes). 
 40. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 28, at 73-75 (―Our tax system does not reach mere 
changes in property value . . . .‖). 
 41. See Eustice, supra note 5, at 142 (―Taxpayers‘ ability to select which gains or losses 
are to be recognized for tax purposes, and when that event is to occur, is a common theme in 
many tax shelter transaction planning scenarios.‖).  Of course the realization rule is not a 
universal tax law tenet, and is undercut in certain circumstances by alternative timing rules, 
such as the mark-to-market accounting rules.  See I.R.C. § 475 (2006) (mark-to-market 
accounting rules for securities dealers).  Conversely, not all realization events will trigger 
recognition.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 351 (2006) (general non-recognition rule for certain asset 
transfers to corporations). 
 42. See sources cited supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
 43. Id. 
 44. E.g., I.R.C. § 267 (2006) (disallowing deduction for losses on sale or exchange of 
property between certain related taxpayers); I.R.C. § 318 (2006) (describing relationships 
creating attribution in stock ownership).  See also Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469 (discussing use 
of newly incorporated corporation in transaction to reduce tax liability). 
 45. See generally CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 28, at 73-75. 
 46. 293 U.S. 465.  In that case, the individual taxpayer was the sole owner of a 
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of the wholly owned or controlled corporation in early cases such as 
Gregory v. Helvering has in many cases been replaced by the use of 
unrelated (or less obviously related) third-party intermediaries and 
counterparties.
47
  However, the fact that these transactions are designed to 
contain the ―friction‖ necessary to create realization events by involving 
other ―persons‖ has remained constant.  For example, in Compaq Computer 
Corp. v. Commissioner and IES Industries, Inc. v. United States, cases that 
involved the purchase of American Depository Receipts cum dividend and 
their almost immediate sale ex dividend, the participation of third-party 
sellers and buyers of the ADRs were what allowed the losses and tax 
credits at issue to be generated.
48
  Similarly, in the consolidated option-
straddle tax shelter cases, the broker-dealers who transacted with the 
taxpayers to buy or sell options allowed the ordinary losses and long-term 
capital gains to be generated in the first place.
49
  The realization function 
played by third parties can be observed in numerous other tax shelter 
cases.
50
  In short, the realization function played by third parties in shelter 
and non-shelter cases means that third-party participation significantly 
impacts the timing of the income inclusion or loss generation, in the sense 
that such third-party participation can determine when income is realized or 
other tax consequences triggered.
51
 
2. The Financing Function 
Another important function often played by third parties in shelter and 
non-shelter cases is the financing function.  The financing function 
 
corporation (―Oldco‖), which owned securities with a built-in gain.  The taxpayer 
incorporated a new corporation (―Newco‖) and caused Oldco to transfer the securities to 
Newco.  Newco was liquidated just a few days later and distributed the securities to 
taxpayer in complete liquidation.  This transaction transformed what would have been 
ordinary income from Oldco‘s sale of securities and distribution of proceeds into capital 
gain. 
 47. E.g., Rice‘s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm‘r, 81 T.C. 184 (1983), aff‟d in part, rev‟d 
in part, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 48. IES Indus. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001); Compaq Computer Corp. 
v. Comm‘r, 113 T.C. 214 (1999), rev‟d, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 49. Glass, 87 T.C. 1087.  These were cases in which the taxpayers entered into straddle 
transactions for options and futures and subsequently ―closed out‖ these transactions by 
buying and selling identical offsetting positions.  The overall goal was to convert ordinary 
income into long-term capital gains and generate ordinary losses. 
 50. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) (involving insurance company); 
Coltec Indus. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (involving third-party banks); 
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 90 Fed. Cl. at 234 (use of separate phases accounting enabled 
by transaction with third party changed timing of income recognition); Black & Decker, 436 
F.3d 431 (involving third-party buyer of BDHMI stock). 
 51. See Compaq Computer Corp., 277 F.3d at 784; IES Indus., 253 F.3d at 352-56.  See 
also I.R.C. § 1091 (2006) (wash sale rules). 
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overlaps with the realization function in the sense that both go to gain or 
loss recognition.  For analytical purposes, I address the financing function 
separately as affecting the amount of gain or loss recognition or other tax 
benefit, rather than its timing. 
 The amount of money or other consideration paid by the third party 
in a transaction obviously has an important tax impact.
52
  For example, in a 
basic scenario, the price paid on a sale of property to a third party in 
relation to the property‘s basis will determine the amount of gain or loss to 
be recognized on the transaction.
53
  This is, of course, no less true in tax 
shelter cases.
54
  The magnitude of the amount paid, financed, or contributed 
by a third party in a shelter transaction can cause large amounts of gain or 
loss to be recognized, often in excess of true economic losses.
55
  For 
example, in Coltec Industries v. United States, the de minimis amount paid 
by third-party banks for the stock of a Coltec subsidiary in relation to the 
taxpayer‘s claimed tax basis in that stock allowed the taxpayer to claim an 
almost $380 million loss on the sale of those shares to the banks.
56
  The 
taxpayer sought to use those losses to offset approximately $241 million in 
gains for that tax year and to carry forward the balance.
57
  Thus, the amount 
―financed‖ by the third-party banks worked in conjunction with the 
taxpayer‘s basis-inflation transactions among its subsidiaries to generate 
the desired tax consequences (which were ultimately denied).
58
 
 Another example of a third party serving a financing function was in 
the contingent installment sales (―CINS‖) shelter cases.  These were cases 
in which the taxpayers sought the application of the contingent installment 
sales regulations to offset domestic partner capital gains.
59
  In the CINS 
cases, the third-party foreign bank contributed millions of dollars to a 
partnership in which it had partnered with a domestic corporation seeking 
to offset large amounts of capital gain.
60
  The capital invested by the bank 
was critical in allowing the partnership to make sizeable investments in 
short-term private placement notes, which were then exchanged for cash 
 
 52. See I.R.C. § 61 (2006) (defining gross income). 
 53. See generally I.R.C. § 1001 (2006) (rules for determining gain or loss); I.R.C. §§ 
1011-12, 1016 (2006) (rules pertaining to basis of property). 
 54. See Black & Decker, 436 F.3d 431 (case in which taxpayer paid $561 million to 
subsidiary in exchange for subsidiary‘s stock and assumption of $560 million contingent 
liability, sold shares to ―unrelated‖ third-party trust benefitting former employee of taxpayer 
for $1 million, and claimed $560 million capital loss). 
 55. See sources cited supra notes 53-54.  The importance of valuation studies and 
opinions in constructing shelter cases confirms this point.  See I.R.C. § 6700(a)(2)(B), (b) 
(2006) (penalty for gross valuation overstatements). 
 56. 454 F.3d at 1345. 
 57. Id. at 1343-45. 
 58. Id. at 1345. 
 59. E.g., ACM P‟ship, 157 F.3d 231. 
 60. E.g., id. at 238-39. 
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and LIBOR notes to trigger the application of the ratable basis recovery 
rule in the CINS Treasury regulations.
61
  In short, the contribution of large 
amounts by the foreign partner ultimately allowed large amounts of capital 
losses to be triggered, thereby achieving the desired capital gains offset 
(which was disallowed).
62
  The foreign bank‘s role in the CINS transaction 
is a prime example of the financing role played by third parties in shelter 
and non-shelter tax transactions. 
3. The Stripping / Diversion Function 
A third function that third parties serve is that of ―stripping‖ or 
diverting certain types of tax items (and their corresponding consequences) 
to those taxpayers able to absorb them at the least tax cost.  A simple case 
of income diversion might involve a gift of interest-bearing securities by a 
parent in a higher income bracket to a child in a lower income bracket who 
is likely to be taxed at a lower rate.
63
  Diversion of income, losses, or other 
tax attributes is a widespread phenomenon in the tax shelter area and is 
often performable by virtue of third-party assistance.  For example, the 
diversion function of third parties is observable (alongside the financing 
function) in the CINS cases discussed above.
64
  A central feature of the 
CINS partnership transactions was the initial allocation of gain to the 
foreign bank partner (the tax-indifferent party) followed by the allocation 
of losses—after the exit of the foreign bank from the partnership—to the 
domestic partner seeking to use those losses to offset capital gains.
65
  Thus, 
the combined actions of the third-party foreign bank—providing the 
requisite financing and making a timely exit—allowed the losses to be 
diverted to the party seeking to utilize them.  In this way, third parties help 
to accomplish the desired location of tax items, such as losses. 
The stripping function of third parties in shelter cases is also 
observable in ―lease stripping‖ shelter transactions.  For example, in 
Andantech L.L.C. v. Commissioner, an equipment sale-leaseback stripping 
transaction, the taxpayer partnership (whose interests were originally held 
by foreign individuals) purchased equipment from a seller and leased it 
back to the seller, receiving a stream of rental income.
66
  The partnership 
then sold the rental income stream to a third-party bank, effectively 
―stripping‖ the rental income from the equipment and accelerating its 
 
 61. E.g., id. at 239-40. 
 62. E.g., id. at 247-48.  Accord supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
 63. I.R.C. §§ 1, 61, 102(a) (2006). 
 64. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
 65. E.g., ACM P‟ship, 157 F.3d at 239, 242-43. 
 66. 331 F.3d 972, 973 (D.C. Cir. 2003), aff‟g in part 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1476, 1480, 
1491-94 (2002). 
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recognition to the year in which Andantech‘s partners were foreign and 
therefore tax indifferent.
67
  Subsequently, 98% of the partnership interests 
were sold to a domestic taxpayer, thereby enabling the new domestic 
partner to utilize the tax attributes (depreciation deductions).
68
  The new 
domestic partner would be able to take advantage of these tax attributes 
without having to recognize income because the income recognition had 
been accelerated upon the sale of the rent stream to the banks,
69
 causing it 
to have hit the tax return of the tax-indifferent foreign partners.
70
  Hence, in 
Andantech and other lease stripping cases, the third-party bank‘s 
participation triggered acceleration of the income stream, allowing the tax 
benefits to be enjoyed by the domestic partner while the income was 
diverted to a tax-indifferent party.  The Andantech case illustrates the 
stripping/diversion function of third parties and shows how the stripping 
function works in conjunction with the realization and financing functions 
of such third parties to trigger desired tax consequences.  This diversion 
role of third parties can be seen in lease stripping cases and various other 
types of cases.
71
 
B. Third-Party Relationships in Context:  Understanding Their 
Proliferation 
The foregoing discussion illustrates the critically important role that 
third-party participants play in triggering desired tax consequences.  The 
roles of third parties today are more important than ever.  As others have 
noted, the nature of contemporary tax shelter transactions has undeniably 
changed as compared to pre-1986 shelters,
72
 and the roles played by third 
 
 67. Id. at 973, aff‟g in part 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1480, 1494-95. 
 68. Id. at 973-74, aff‟g in part 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1480, 1495-96. 
 69. Note that the banks were performing a realization/timing function as well as a 
financing function. 
 70. Andantech, 331 F.3d at 974, aff‟g in part 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1480, 1498. 
 71. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm‘r, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 
2001) (taxpayer was able to divert revenue from excess value charges collected from 
customers to its offshore subsidiary by making insurance payments to a third-party 
insurance company; insurance company collected commission, excise taxes, and fees, and 
sent remainder of insurance payments to taxpayer‘s Bermuda subsidiary under reinsurance 
contract); CMA Consol., Inc., T.C.M. (RIA) 2005-16 (another equipment lease stripping 
case).  
 72. Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NOTES 1775, 
1776 (1999) (discussing characteristics of the post-1986 tax shelter market and arguing that 
―[t]he new corporate tax shelter is much more sophisticated and complex than its 1980s 
predecessor,‖ and that ―[i]t is also much more aggressive in its interpretation of the tax 
law‖); Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 12, at 1951-52 (noting that pre-1986 shelters were 
of the same general type with ―virtually all involv[ing] the creation of artificial 
(noneconomic) losses for passive investors through the combination of tax preferences . . . 
and interest expense deductions‖ and comparing this to contemporary tax shelters, which are 
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parties in these transactions have evolved as well.  A key shift in 
contemporary tax shelter transactions is the increasing involvement of 
participants such as tax-exempt entities and foreign entities, and the 
increasingly diverse nature of such participation.
73
  More of this 
participation is occurring by way of flow-through entities, and such third-
party participation increasingly serves to arbitrage between different sets of 
tax rules, including tax rules governing non-U.S. taxpayers and the tax 
rules of other countries.
74
  Furthermore, as others have argued, those who 
stand to make large profits are more aggressive in structuring, marketing, 
and promoting shelter transactions.
75
  These developments have arguably 
been fueled by advancements in telecommunications and technology, 
which have also made it easier for persons to interact, negotiate, and form 
relationships with other parties and to enter into relationships and 
 
―considerably more varied in design—and in the Code provisions they exploit‖); 
McCormack, supra note 12, at 703, 706-08 (contrasting relative homogeneity of early 
shelter transactions with the complexity, diversity, numerosity, aggressiveness, and ―rapid 
proliferation‖ of current shelters); Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax 
Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 83-95 (2006) (describing how the 
tax shelter market ―took off‖ in the decade after 1986). 
 73. See, e.g., Eustice, supra note 5, at 145 (noting ―the frequent insertion of ‗tax 
indifferent parties‘ into the transaction, whose role it is to absorb the unfavorable tax aspects 
of‖ transactions using derivative instruments and stating that ―this unlikely ménage of 
players is brought together by the promoter for the sole purpose of generating the sought-
after tax benefits for the corporate ‗investor‘‖).  See also Bankman, supra note 72, at 1777 
(listing as one of the characteristics of the ―new‖ corporate tax shelter that ―the shelter 
involves a domestic corporation and a person in the zero tax bracket,‖ and noting that 
―[m]ost commonly, the zero-bracket taxpayer is a foreign person not subject to U.S. tax, but 
Native American Tribes, domestic corporations with unusable net operating losses, and 
exempt organizations have also been used‖); Eustice, supra note 5, at 147 (stating that there 
seems to be ―no magic bullet, or stake-in-the-heart solution‖ to the tax shelter problem 
because ―[t]he current deals are too diverse‖);. 
 74. See sources cited supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.  See also GAO 
REPORT ON NETWORK TAX EVASION, supra note 10 (studying the problem of network-based 
tax evasion). 
 75. See, e.g., Eustice, supra note 5, at 146 (describing the ―stunning profitability of 
these corporate shelter transactions for their promoters‖); McCormack, supra note 12, at 708 
(―[T]he players in the new tax shelter battles are both enumerative and aggressive.  Those 
who market current tax shelters . . . do so in a bullish manner because of the lucrative nature 
of the business.‖).  See also STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. 
ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 108TH CONG., REP. ON U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY:  THE 
ROLE OF ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS, AND FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS (Comm. Print 2003) 
(―[T]he development and sale of potentially abusive and illegal tax shelters have become a 
lucrative business in the United States, and professional organizations like major accounting 
firms, banks, investment advisory firms, and law firms have become major developers and 
promoters.  The evidence also shows that respected professional firms are spending 
substantial resources, forming alliances, and developing the internal and external 
infrastructure necessary to design, market, and implement hundreds of complex tax shelters, 
some of which are illegal and improperly deny the U.S. Treasury of billions of dollars in tax 
revenues.‖). 
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transactions that enable the avoidance of taxation.
76
  The increased 
presence of actors looking to facilitate the creation of formal relationships 
means greater markets and opportunities for relationship formation 
between taxpayers and third parties. 
There are two legal developments that have played a particularly 
important role in facilitating the growing use and importance of third-party 
participation in aggressive tax planning. 
1.  Evolution in the Laws of Entity Classification 
Most significantly, developments over time in the law of entity 
formation and classification have contributed to the ease with which 
taxpayers are able to form relationships (and choose the form of such 
relationships) with others.  Under current law, eligible ―business entities‖ 
are allowed to choose whether to be classified for tax purposes as a 
partnership or as an association taxable as a corporation.
77
  This ability to 
elect one‘s entity classification for tax purposes resulted from the IRS‘s 
1996 adoption of the so-called check-the-box regulations.
78
  These 
regulations generally provide that eligible taxpayers may elect their federal 
tax classification by filing IRS Form 8832 and checking the appropriate 
box.
79
 
The choice of whether to be classified as a corporation or as a 
partnership is a significant one for tax purposes because corporations and 
partnerships are treated differently under the Code.  Generally speaking, 
corporations are subject to double taxation at both the entity and the 
shareholder level, while partnerships are not subject to an entity-level tax 
 
 76. See generally Aldo Forgione, Clicks and Mortar: Taxing Multinational Business 
Profits in the Digital Age, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 719 (2003) (noting the increased ability 
for tax avoidance due to technological advances and the advent of e-commerce, and 
proposing reform based on a ―market country‖ concept). 
 77. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-3(a), -2(b); IRS Form 8832.  Business entities classified 
per se as corporations are not eligible to make the election.  Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-3(a), -
2(b).  The term ―business entities‖ also does not include entities classified as trusts under 
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4 or subject to a special tax regime under the Code.  Id. § 301.7701-
2(a).  Eligible ―business entities‖ that do not make an explicit election are classified by 
default as either corporations or partnerships, depending on whether that entity is a domestic 
or a foreign entity, and depending on whether all of its owners have limited liability.  Treas. 
Reg. § 301.7701-3(b).  For ―business entities‖ with a single owner the choice is between 
disregarded entity and corporate classification, rather than partnership or corporate 
classification.  Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-3(a), -3(b)(1)(ii), -3(b)(2)(i)(C).  For purposes of 
analyzing taxpayer relationships with third parties, this discussion focuses on entities with 
more than one owner (i.e., the partnership vs. corporation distinction). 
 78. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2, -3 (as adopted by T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215).  These 
regulations, which were proposed in May and finalized in December 1996, became effective 
January 1, 1997. 
 79. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(b), -3(a). 
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and are taxed instead on a flow-through basis.
80
  With respect to shelter 
transactions, the use of partnerships enables a host of opportunities for tax 
avoidance.  First, partnership classification has the potential to allow 
parties to allocate income items to a tax-indifferent party and loss items to a 
partner most able to use these losses, thus opening up avoidance 
possibilities.
81
  In addition, partnership classification may allow a partner to 
use the losses generated from the activities of the partnership to offset 
income from other sources.
82
  The use of partnership losses to offset other 
income can be seen in a number of tax shelter cases.
83
  Furthermore, the 
fact that the check-the-box elective entity classification system was also 
made applicable to foreign entities has opened up new opportunities for tax 
planning in the cross-border context.
84
 
The use of partnerships in tax planning certainly did not begin with 
adoption of the check-the-box regulations.
85
  These regulations were merely 
 
 80. Compare I.R.C. §§ 11(a), 61(a)(7) (2006), and I.R.C. § 301 (2006) (effectuating 
corporate double taxation), with I.R.C. § 701 (2006) (taxation of partnerships). 
 81. Under the provisions of Subchapter K, the income, loss, deductions, credits, and 
other tax items of a partnership are generally taken into account at the partner level, and 
may be allocated in accordance with the partnership agreement, provided the allocation has 
―substantial economic effect.‖  I.R.C. § 704 (2006).  See also Santa Monica Pictures, LLC v. 
Comm‘r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157 (2005) (illustrating use of partnership structure to generate 
losses for the appropriate partner). 
 82. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., REVIEW OF SELECTED ENTITY 
CLASSIFICATION AND PARTNERSHIP TAX ISSUES 7 (Comm. Print 1997) [hereinafter, JCT 
REVIEW OF ENTITY CLASSIFICATION] (noting that one reason for preferring pass-through tax 
treatment is that ―owners may wish to use losses generated by the business to offset income 
from other sources‖).  See also Leandra Lederman, A Tisket, A Tasket: Basketing and 
Corporate Tax Shelters, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 557 (2011) (proposing to segregate corporate 
taxpayers‘ passive and active income in order to prevent use of offsetting losses). 
 83. See, e.g., Sala v. United States, 613 F.3d 1249, 1250 (10th Cir. 2010); ACM P‟ship, 
157 F.3d 231; Santa Monica Pictures, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157.   
 84. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-3(a), -3(b)(2).  Various commentators have argued that 
electivity of corporate, partnership, or disregarded entity status make it easier for taxpayers 
to avoid income inclusion under the Subpart F ―controlled foreign corporation‖ rules, allow 
taxpayers to get tax savings by getting rid of deferral, and permit taxpayers greater leeway 
to utilize foreign tax credits.  See, e.g., JCT REVIEW OF ENTITY CLASSIFICATION, supra note 
82, at 19 n.32 (citing Reuven Avi-Yonah, To End Deferral As We Know It:  Simplification 
Potential of Check-The-Box, 74 TAX NOTES 219, 219-20 (1997)); Harvey Mogenson & 
David Benson, IRS Issues Final Check-the-Box Regs—Tax Simplification Creates Planning 
Opportunities, 13 TAX NOTES INT‘L 2159 (1996)).  See also Heather Field, Checking In On 
“Check-The-Box”, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 487-91 (2009) (discussing problems and 
concerns pertaining to application of the check-the-box system in the international context). 
 85. See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, 
ESTATES, AND GIFTS § 85.3.1 (4th ed. 2003) (noting increase in partnership tax shelters in 
the 1970s); ARTHUR B. WILLIS, JOHN S. PENNELL & PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP 
TAXATION ¶ 19.01[3] (6th ed. 1997) (discussing ―substantial growth in large syndicated tax 
shelters as limited partnerships‖ in the 1970s); Eustice, supra note 5, at 138 (noting that ―the 
entity status issue . . . has been through many phases before reaching its current state of 
nearly unlimited entity selectivity‖). 
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the culmination of shifts over time that gradually made it easier for 
taxpayers to enter into formal relationships with other persons, regardless 
of the substance of those relationships.
86
  Prior to the check-the-box 
regulations, taxpayers could ensure that an entity would be classified as a 
corporation rather than a partnership by satisfying the ―corporate 
resemblance‖ test set forth in the so-called Kintner regulations, the 
Treasury Regulations in effect at that time.
87
  However, by eliminating the 
need to meet the factors set forth in the Kintner regulations, these 
regulations have had the effect of allowing favorable entity classification 
status to be obtained more cheaply, simply, and with more certainty.  This 
has made entity-based tax planning less risky and more palatable for risk-
averse players and less sophisticated players.
88
  Indeed, the Joint 
Committee on Taxation has noted that the ―check-the-box‖ regime has had 
the effects of eliminating or reducing transaction costs, lowering 
compliance costs, enhancing entity-choice availability for taxpayers other 
than the well-advised or sophisticated, indirectly affecting the substance of 
tax rules that are dependent on an entity‘s classification, and generally 
making tax planning easier.
89
  Thus, the implementation of ―check-the-box‖ 
 
 86. Susan Pace Hamill, The Story of LLCs: Combining the Best Features of a Flawed 
Business Tax Structure, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 295 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds., 
2005) (describing the history behind the rise of limited liability company statutes and the 
eventual adoption of the check-the-box regulations). 
 87. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3 (as adopted by T.D. 6503, 1960-2 
C.B. 409 and amended by T.D. 8697).  In Kintner v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 976, 979 
(D. Mont. 1952), aff‟d 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), the federal district court and the Ninth 
Circuit determined that an association of medical professionals that had more corporate than 
non-corporate characteristics was taxable as a corporation for federal tax purposes.  The IRS 
subsequently adopted the ―corporate resemblance‖ approach of Kintner in regulations issued 
in 1960.  The Kintner regulations set forth six ―major characteristics ordinarily found in a 
pure corporation‖:  (i) associates, (ii) an objective to carry on business and divide the gains 
therefrom, (iii) continuity of life, (iv) centralization of management, (v) liability for 
corporate debts limited to corporate property, and (vi) free transferability of interests, and 
stated that an entity with more corporate than non-corporate characteristics would be treated 
as a corporation.  Id.  In performing this analysis, the Kinter regulations disregarded 
characteristics common to both corporate and non-corporate entities.  Treas. Reg. § 
301.7701-2(a) (citing Morrissey v. Comm‘r, 296 U.S. 344 (1935)). 
 88. Field, supra note 84, at 471-74 (discussing the benefits of increased certainty and 
simplicity). 
 89. JCT REVIEW OF ENTITY CLASSIFICATION, supra note 82, at 2 (stating that regulations 
―simplify and liberalize the entity classification rules, thereby enhancing the ability of the 
owners of a business entity to choose to be treated as a partnership for tax purposes.‖); id. at 
17-18 (―The principal impact is that taxpayers may now choose with greater simplicity and 
lower compliance costs whether they will pay two levels of tax on business income under 
the corporate tax rules, or whether they will pay only one level of tax under the partnership 
tax rules . . . . The check-the-box regulations facilitate transactions that could not usually be 
done (or could be done only in a convoluted or expensive manner) under prior law, but now 
may be accomplished more simply, efficiently or cheaply.‖); id. at 21 (discussing ―the 
indirect effect of broad electivity . . . on other tax rules whose application is dependent on 
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has allowed taxpayers to more easily enter into formal relationships with 
other parties that generate desired tax consequences, and to do so with 
more certainty.  The evolution of tax law‘s approach to entity classification 
is arguably more broadly reflective of the growth in the number of planning 
options for the formation of business entities generally.
90
 
2.  The Multiple-Party Presumption of Frank Lyon Co. v. United 
States 
Developments in the laws of entity formation and classification aside, 
another factor has also contributed to the growing significance of taxpayer 
relationships with third parties over time.  The Supreme Court‘s 
suggestion, in its seminal 1978 Frank Lyon decision,
91
 that that case was 
distinguishable from the transaction in Helvering v. Lazarus & Co.
92
 based 
on the existence of multiple parties,
93
 has caused the existence of third 
parties in tax-planning transactions to be viewed more enthusiastically by 
practitioners than might otherwise have been the case.
94
  Frank Lyon 
concerned a multi-party sale-leaseback transaction and was a case in which 
the tax transaction admittedly ―took shape according to [the third-party 
 
the taxpayer‘s tax status‖).  See also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, OPTIONS TO 
IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 183-85 (Comm. Print 2005) 
[hereinafter JCT, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE] (describing the regulations as 
having ―created some unintended tax-avoidance opportunities as applied to foreign entities‖ 
and noting that ―the expressly elective approach of the current regulations has removed 
some frictions that may have acted as a brake on some of the tax planning involving the 
classification of entities‖); Field, supra note 84, at 471-96 (discussing how well the check-
the-box system has met the goals of simplicity and administrability, efficiency and reduction 
of transaction costs, and flexibility/neutrality). 
 90. See generally Hamill, Story of LLCs, supra note 86; Charlie Cray & Lee Drutman, 
Corporations and the Public Purpose: Restoring the Balance, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 305 
(2005).  
 91. 435 U.S. 561 (1978). 
 92. 308 U.S. 252 (1939). 
 93. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 575-76 (―The present case, in contrast [to Lazarus], 
involves three parties . . . the presence of the third party, in our view, significantly 
distinguishes this case from Lazarus and removes the latter as controlling authority.‖) 
 94. See Hoffman F. Fuller, Sales and Leasebacks and the Frank Lyon Case, 48 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 60, 81 (1979) (cautioning that sale-leaseback transactions ―should not be 
limited to two parties; a third-party lender should be involved‖); Bernard Wolfman, The 
Supreme Court in the Lyon‟s Den: A Failure of Judicial Process, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 
1087-88 (1981) (asserting that in distinguishing multiparty transactions from two party 
transactions, ―the Court‘s opinion does nothing but signal tax lawyers that clients seeking 
tax shelter should never travel in pairs‖).  The presence of purposefully secured third-party 
participation has encountered varying degrees of respect from courts.  See also Consol. 
Edison Co. of N.Y., 90 Fed. Cl. at 267, 270-72, 338 (making numerous references to the 
Frank Lyon ―multiple-party transaction‖ standard). Compare Bussing v. Comm‘r, 88 T.C. 
449 (1987) with Newman v. Comm‘r, 902 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1990).  
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bank‘s] needs.‖
95
  In Frank Lyon, the third-party bank had originally sought 
to construct a new building for its headquarters and banking facility.
96
  
However, state and federal banking laws and regulations prevented the 
bank from financing, constructing, and owning the proposed building 
itself.
97
  This led the bank to enter into the sale-leaseback transaction at 
issue with the taxpayer and a finance agency, whereby the taxpayer (Lyon) 
would own the building and deduct depreciation, rent, and other expenses 
on its tax return, while including in income rent received from the bank.
98
  
Under this set of circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the 
transaction should be respected for tax purposes and distinguished the case 
from Lazarus on the ground that that case only involved two parties.
99
  As 
others have noted, Frank Lyon has wrongly established a presumption of 
respect toward transactions employing multiple unrelated party 
relationships, as distinct from transactions not involving multiple parties, 
and has encouraged the formal use of unnecessary parties in tax 
transactions.
100
  This has somewhat undercut the effectiveness of the 
traditional anti-abuse doctrines. 
In sum, the evolution of tax law‘s approach to entity classification into 
its present form, and the lingering effects of the Frank Lyon presumption, 
suggest that increasingly aggressive and complex third-party participation 
is here to stay.  As argued further in Part III, these two factors have also 
served to inhibit the effectiveness of traditional judicial doctrines like 
substance-over-form or economic substance in adequately dealing with 
aggressive and increasingly sophisticated relationship formation between 
taxpayers and third parties.  They have accomplished this by introducing 
new and more complex ways for persons to form written and unwritten 
relationships with each other and by making relevant considerations that 
 
 95. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 561, 563, 576. 
 96. Id. at 563. 
 97. Id. at 563-64.  As described in the Court‘s opinion, the bank‘s original plan had to 
be abandoned because (1) under Arkansas law, the bank was only allowed to pay a limited 
amount of interest on the debentures it wanted to issue in order to finance construction and 
this interest limitation would cause the debentures not to be marketable; and (2) state and 
federal regulatory approval would be required in order for the bank to invest in premises of 
a certain value relative to the bank‘s capitalization, and the bank had been informed that 
such approval would not be forthcoming.  Id. 
 98. Id. at 561. 
 99. Id. at 564, 583-84 (―[W]here, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party transaction 
with economic substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory 
realities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-
avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the Government should honor the 
allocation of rights and duties effectuated by the parties.‖). 
 100. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 94; Wolfman, supra note 94, at 1099-1100 (―A 
Supreme Court opinion ought not become the basis for tax lawyers to make a laughingstock 
of the Court as they now do when quite routinely they add unnecessary third parties to 
financing transactions in order to qualify for the shelter of Frank Lyon.‖). 
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offset the analytical force of the lens that has traditionally been applied to 
interrogate transactions for ―risk‖ or ―substance.‖ 
III. JUDICIAL ANTI-ABUSE ANALYSIS AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
Judicial anti-abuse analysis is relationship analysis.  However, 
traditional judicial anti-abuse analysis cannot be the sum total of how we 
confront relationality in tax planning.  Part III.A shows that relationship 
analysis is an integral (albeit often unspoken) part of judicial anti-abuse 
analysis.  Parts III.B and III.C examine the challenges facing courts in 
dealing with third-party relationality in applying anti-abuse doctrines and 
discuss how judicial treatments of third-party relationships can be 
improved. 
A. Judicial Doctrines as Relationship Analysis 
Anti-abuse doctrines play a critical role in judicial evaluations of tax 
shelter cases.
101
  In addition to judicial anti-abuse rules, there are also 
statutory and regulatory anti-abuse rules that may apply to shelter 
transactions.
102
  However, for a variety of reasons, judicial anti-abuse rules 
have enjoyed more widespread application and have been more successful 
in curbing abusive shelter transactions.
103
  Therefore, the focus of this 
Article is on the judicial anti-abuse doctrines (including the recently 
codified economic substance doctrine). 
The judicial anti-abuse doctrines—which include the substance-over-
form doctrine, the sham transaction doctrine, the step-transaction doctrine, 
the business purpose doctrine, and the economic substance doctrine—are 
related and overlapping judicial doctrines that are applied by courts to deny 
favorable tax consequences in tax-driven transactions.
104
  These doctrines 
are often applied in situations where the transaction satisfies the literal 
 
 101. See generally BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 85, at ¶ 4.3 (discussing pervasive 
judicial doctrines); YORAM KEINAN, 508 TAX MGMT., THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE 
(BNA 2007); JEFFREY H. PARAVANO & MELINDA L. REYNOLDS, 798 TAX MGMT., TAX 
SHELTERS § I.B (BNA 2003). 
 102. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 269; 482 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (partnership anti-abuse 
regulation). 
 103. PARAVANO & REYNOLDS, supra note 101, § I.B (―[S]tatutory and regulatory [anti-
abuse] rules have generally been less effective than the judicial doctrines.‖).  Some of these 
reasons include vagueness, overbreadth, and unrealistic burdens of proof.  Id. §§ I.B.2 & 
I.B.3. 
 104. See generally, KEINAN, supra note 101, §§ III-IV.  While these doctrines have 
traditionally been common law doctrines, the economic substance doctrine was recently 
codified by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, § 1409, 124 Stat. 1029 (March 30, 2010), as the new 26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o) (West 
2010).  See also discussion infra Part IV.B. 
OEIFINALIZED_TWO_UPDATED 3/23/2011  4:43 PM 
406 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 13:2 
 
letter of the statute but leads to unintended or ―too good to be true‖ tax 
results.  The application of these doctrines by courts is sometimes 
confusing.  Courts may apply more than one doctrine to deny tax benefits 
in any one case.
105
  And applications of the doctrines have not been 
consistent across courts and circuits.
106
 
Probably the most discussed, debated, and applied of the judicial anti-
abuse doctrines is the newly codified economic substance doctrine.
107
  By 
way of background, the economic substance doctrine is a widely applied 
doctrine that, like the other judicial anti-abuse doctrines, originated in 
common law.  In its common law incarnation, it had two main components 
or ―prongs‖—one objective and the other subjective.
108
  The subjective, 
―business purpose‖ component generally held that a transaction engaged in 
solely for tax avoidance, and for no independent non-tax business purpose, 
would not be recognized as valid.
109
  The other prong of the contemporary 
economic substance doctrine, the so-called objective prong, had several 
different formulations, all of which asked in one way or another whether 
the transaction resulted in a meaningful change in the taxpayer‘s economic 
position.
110
  The economic substance doctrine in its uncodified form was 
not uniformly applied across circuits—while some courts considered the 
test to be a disjunctive one, others viewed the two prongs as conjunctive.
111
  
Still other courts applied a unitary sham test in determining whether 
economic substance exists.
112
 
After extensive debate and various legislative proposals, Congress 
finally codified the economic substance doctrine in the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 as a conjunctive, two-part test 
 
 105. KEINAN, supra note 101, at A-1 n.9 (citing JCT, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX 
COMPLIANCE, supra note 89, at 14); see also e.g., Andantech, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1476 
(applying the step transaction doctrine, sham transaction doctrine, and substance over form 
doctrine). 
 106. KEINAN, supra note 101, at A-1. 
 107. See infra notes 108-114. 
 108. KEINAN, supra note 101, at A-41. 
 109. The business purpose prong developed out of another long-standing judicial 
doctrine, the business purpose doctrine.  See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 
(1935); Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1972); Comm‘r v. Transp. 
Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1949).  After Frank Lyon was 
decided in 1978, the business purpose doctrine was incorporated into the present-day, two-
pronged economic substance doctrine to form the subjective prong of the two-pronged, 
economic substance test.  Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); see also Rice‘s Toyota World 
v. Comm‘r, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that a transaction will be treated as ―a 
sham‖ if ―the taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax 
benefits . . . and that the transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable 
possibility of a profit exists‖). 
 110. KEINAN, supra note 101, at A-43. 
 111. Id. at A-42. 
 112. Id. 
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requiring the transaction to ―change[] in a meaningful way (apart from 
Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position‖ and that ―the 
taxpayer ha[ve] a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax 
effects) for entering into such transaction.‖
113 
 The effects of this doctrine‘s  
codification will be further discussed in Parts IV and V of this Article.
114
 
Aside from the economic substance doctrine, courts also apply other 
related judicial doctrines, such as the substance-over-form doctrine and the 
sham transaction doctrine.  As its name suggests, the substance-over-form 
doctrine holds that in situations where the substance of a transaction is 
different from its form, substance controls.
115
  In such situations, courts 
may re-characterize the transaction in accordance with its actual substance, 
leading to tax consequences different than those desired by the taxpayer.
116
  
The sham transaction doctrine is a doctrine similar to the economic 
substance doctrine in that it basically asks whether the way a transaction 
has been structured comports with underlying economic realities.
117
 
While these anti-abuse doctrines can be confusing, overlapping, and 
inconsistently applied, they all are, at their core, concerned with evaluating 
the merits of the chosen form of suspect transactions.
118
  And, as discussed 
 
 113. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o) (West 2010) (applicable to transactions entered into after 
March 30, 2010).  The newly enacted provision contains special rules for situations in which 
the taxpayer relies on profit potential, and for treatment of fees, foreign taxes, and state and 
local taxes.  Id. § 7701(o)(2). 
 114. In particular, see discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 115. See, e.g., Gregory, 293 U.S. 465; In re CM Holdings, Inc., 301 F.3d 96, 102 (3d 
Cir. 2002). 
 116. See, e.g., Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939) (applying 
substance over form in leasing case).  For a more in-depth discussion of such 
recharacterization in the context of leasing, see Shu-Yi Oei, Context Matters: The 
Recharacterization of Leases in Bankruptcy and Tax Law, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 635 (2008). 
 117. This is, at least, what the ―sham in substance‖ doctrine does.  Like the economic 
substance doctrine, the ―sham in substance doctrine‖ has different variations across courts.  
Compare Falsetti v. Comm‘r, 85 T.C. 332, 347 (1985) (defining ―sham in substance‖ as ―the 
expedient of drawing up papers to characterize transactions contrary to objective economic 
realities and which have no economic significance beyond expected tax benefits‖), with 
Friedman v. Comm‘r, 869 F.2d 785, 792 (4th Cir. 1989) (―A ‗sham‘ transaction is one that 
has no economic effect other than the creation of tax losses.‖), and Rice‟s Toyota World, 
752 F.2d at 91 (―To treat a transaction as a sham, the court must find that the taxpayer was 
motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the 
transaction, and that the transaction has no economic substance because no reasonable 
possibility of a profit exists.‖).  In contrast, the ―sham-in-fact‖ standard looks at transactions 
that may have been ―papered‖ but that never actually occurred.  See Kirchman v. Comm‘r, 
862 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1989) (―Shams in fact are transactions that never occur . . . . 
Shams in substance are transactions that actually occurred but which lack the substance their 
form represents.‖). 
 118. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr. Random Thoughts on Applying Judicial Doctrines to 
Interpret the Internal Revenue Code, 54 SMU L. REV. 195, 206 (2001) (―One of the 
common threads in the corporate tax shelter cases is that the transactions that have been 
scrutinized under the business purpose, economic substance, and sham transaction doctrines, 
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in Part II, what are the transactions but a series of tax events planned and 
taking place using relationships and interactions between taxpayers and 
third parties?
119
  Since most shelter transactions cannot occur absent third-
party cooperation and participation, the evaluation of such transactions 
under commonly applied judicial doctrines is an inherently relationship-
evaluative exercise.  Correspondingly, one might say that it is precisely 
because aggressive (and technically Code-compliant) relationship 
formation is a feature of abusive tax planning transactions that anti-abuse 
doctrines probing the realities of these relationships exist in the first place. 
Put even more strongly, insofar as transactional tax planning largely 
consists of arranging a transaction (or series of transactions) that yields a 
good tax result, and insofar as transactions normally need third parties in 
order to happen, it is very, very hard to do transactional tax planning 
without the involvement of third parties.  This means that it is virtually 
impossible to separate our judgments about the merits of a transaction from 
our judgments about the relationships that make the transaction possible.  
When one says that a tax transaction is a ―shelter‖ or is ―abusive‖ or is 
―lacking substance‖ or is a ―sham,‖ underlying such statements is a 
commentary about the ―false‖ or ―contentless‖ or ―sham‖ nature of the 
relationships and relational events occurring in the transaction, whether 
judges realize this or not and whether their commentary on the underlying 
relationships is explicit or not. 
The relationship-evaluative component of judicial anti-abuse doctrines 
may appear obvious but must not be taken for granted.  The need to make 
explicit the relationship interpretation element of judicial shelter analysis is 
particularly acute at the present time because, for the reasons discussed in 
Part II, aggressively formed and substance-lacking relationships with third 
parties have become much more widespread than at the time the judicial 
anti-abuse doctrines were developed by the courts.
120
  That is, the judicial 
doctrines as applied in today‘s shelter environment are faced with much 
more aggressive relationality than the judicial doctrines as conceived.
121
  As 
discussed, reasons for this may include increased promoter activity, better 
technology, and more easily manipulable entity formation and 
classification rules.  The willingness or ability of judges to use judicial anti-
abuse doctrines to adequately interrogate increasingly aggressive 
relationality is therefore not a foregone conclusion.  Thus, raising 
 
and which have been found to be lacking, are transactions outside the ordinary course of the 
taxpayer‘s business.‖). 
 119. See discussion supra Part II. 
 120. See Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. 561; Gregory, 293 U.S. 465; Rice‟s Toyota World, 752 
F.2d 89; Weinert‘s Estate v. Comm‘r, 294 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961); BITTKER & 
LOKKEN, supra note 85, § 4.3 (citing United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 168 (1921)); 
KEINAN, supra note 101, at A-5 to A-9.  See also sources cited supra notes 72-73. 
 121. See sources cited supra note 120. 
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awareness and posing questions about what courts in shelter cases are and 
should be doing in applying long-standing judicial doctrines is both timely 
and necessary.
122
 
B. Limitations of the Current Approach 
So, is there anything really wrong with simply continuing to apply 
present judicial anti-abuse doctrines in analyzing relationships in shelter 
cases, particular since many courts do already appreciate that the nature of 
a third-party relationship determines whether a given transaction (or series 
of transactions) contains the requisite risk or substance to be respected?
123
  
Despite the apparent adequacy of the current approach, this Article 
contends that it is in fact inadequate, for two important reasons. 
1.  The Ultimate Artificiality of the Economic Substance Analysis 
Far from being a complete solution to the problem of complex and 
hidden relationality, the economic substance and sham transaction 
doctrines are ultimately artificial constructs that do not go far enough.  This 
is not news.  Recent scholarship has acknowledged their limitations in new 
ways, pointing out, for example, that the ―framing‖ of a tax transaction has 
important impacts on case outcomes.
124
  That is, construing ―the 
transaction‖ narrowly as being the discrete part of the deal that creates the 
tax minimization opportunity can lead to a finding of lack of economic 
substance, while framing it more broadly as including the larger business 
deal may lead to the opposite result.
125
  Once the effects of a transaction‘s 
―frame‖ in changing outcomes of shelter litigation are recognized, it 
becomes clear that the anti-abuse doctrines are not all-powerful. 
The ―framing‖ construct can also be applied longitudinally:  
embracing the concept of a ―deal‖ or transaction to ―minimize taxes‖ and 
trying to determine whether that discretely framed deal holds the potential 
 
 122. This is no less true now that the economic substance doctrine has been codified and 
the ―objective prong‖ standard adopted in the new statute asks whether ―the transaction 
changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer‘s 
economic position.‖  26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o)(1)(A) (West 2010).  Though the new provision 
does not mention relationships, relationship evaluation is implicit, because whether there is 
the requisite ―meaningful change‖ depends, of course, on the dynamics of the relationships 
underlying the tax transactions. 
 123. See infra notes 128–137 and accompanying text.  Other scholars seem to agree.  See 
Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning, supra note 10, at 1258, 1261-62. 
 124. David Hariton, The Frame Game: How Defining the “Transaction” Decides the 
Case, 63 TAX LAW. 1 (2009). 
 125. Id. at 4, 7-14 (providing examples of courts characterizing transactions utilizing 
either broad or narrow perspectives and holding accordingly). 
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for ―pre-tax profit‖ or ―economic effects‖ necessarily involves delineating 
an artificial ―end point‖ to the tax deal.  In the context of long-term and 
continuing relationships between the players, however, it is doubtful that 
such an end point actually exists.  The relationship between the players 
may well proceed to take on further dimensions and may involve other 
(future) contracts and understandings beyond the discretely and artificially 
framed ―tax deal‖ in a manner that undercuts the apparent economic effects 
or profit potential in the instant ―deal.‖  The effects of such future contracts 
and understandings might not be adequately taken into account under 
current doctrine. 
What can be done about the problem of continuing relationships and 
their effects beyond the boundaries of an instant tax litigation 
(conceptualized as a discrete transaction or series of transactions with a 
clear end point)?  From a commercial standpoint, the answer, 
unfortunately, is very little, given the realities of a market economy.  What 
can and should be done from a taxing standpoint is to lay a framework to 
increase judicial awareness of the possibility of ongoing relationships 
undercutting discrete-transaction findings of substance.  The solutions 
offered in Part V of this Article go some way toward accomplishing this.
126
  
Suffice it to say, at this juncture, the judicial anti-abuse doctrines are not 
cure-alls for aggressive relationality. 
2.  Uneven Applications of Doctrines and Overriding Effects of the 
Frank Lyon Presumption 
As hinted at in Part II, another key problem facing courts in their 
analysis of aggressive relationality is that the presumption in favor of 
respecting transactions between multiple parties that was created by Frank 
Lyon Co. v. United States still resonates in case law today.
127
  However, 
notwithstanding the Frank Lyon presumption, it is clear that third-party 
relationships actually have indeterminate significance for purposes of 
evaluating whether a transaction has ―substance.‖  The mere existence of a 
third-party relationship can suggest any number of things, and thus, in the 
end, may not tell us enough about the bona fides of a transaction, absent 
further analysis. 
Conceptually speaking, this almost certainly has to be true.  Since 
desired tax consequences in shelter (and non-shelter) arrangements are 
mostly generated through transactions between parties, and since 
transactions are based upon relationships with third parties and not all 
 
 126. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 127. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 583-84.  See also supra Part II.B (discussing impacts of the 
Frank Lyon decision on creation of multiple-party transactions); Wolfman, supra note 94, at 
1099-1100 (discussing the scope and applicability of Frank Lyon). 
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transactions hold up in court, it follows that not all taxpayer-created 
relationships with third parties deserve validation.  So, for example, a 
relationship or transaction with a third party in a shelter transaction could 
be construed as an arm‘s length relationship suggesting genuineness.
128
  On 
the other hand, the third party could simply have been inserted as a ―straw‖ 
or a ―mule‖ to create the illusion of a Frank Lyon-type multiple-party 
transaction.
129
  The eventual determination of whether a shelter transaction 
has substance depends largely on which of these polar opposite 
interpretations a court adopts.
130
 
Also, a transaction with a third party might well display the types of 
―practical economic effects‖ necessary for a transaction to be respected.
131
  
 
 128. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 583-84 (―Where, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party 
transaction with economic substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or 
regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely 
by tax avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the Government should 
honor the allocation of rights and duties effectuated by the parties.‖); id. at 580 (―Lyon [(the 
taxpayer)] is not a corporation with no purpose other than to hold title to the bank building.  
It was not created by [the bank] or even financed to any degree by [the bank].‖).  See also 
United Parcel Serv. of Am., 254 F.3d at 1018 (noting the existence of a ―real insurance 
policy‖ between UPS and an unrelated third-party insurer); IES Indus., 253 F.3d at 355 
(―[T]hese were not transactions conducted by alter-egos of IES or straw entities created by 
IES simply for the purpose of conducting ADR trades . . . . All of the parties involved . . . 
were entities separate and apart from IES, doing legitimate business before IES started 
trading ADRs and (as far as we know) continuing such legitimate business after that time . . 
. . Each trade was an arm‘s-length transaction:  ‗what was actually done is what the parties 
to the transaction purported to do.‘‖) (internal citations omitted)); Compaq Computer Corp., 
277 F.3d at 784 (acknowledging the IES Industries approach to third parties, but adding its 
own analysis of third parties and the existence of risk); Newman, 902 F.2d at 163 (2d Cir. 
1990) (finding it ―relevant that the parties were independent of each other‖); Mukerji v. 
Comm‘r, 87 T.C. 926, 968 (1986). 
 129. See, e.g., Bussing, 89 T.C. at 1051 (disregarding the presence of a third-party 
corporation (Sutton) in a complex sale-lease back transaction, characterizing that party‘s 
presence as ―not an ownership interest‖ but rather as that of a ―straw man‖ designed to make 
the transaction look like a multiple-party transaction to bring the case under the Frank Lyon 
rubric and denying the taxpayer‘s motion for reconsideration).  See also id. at 1054 
(―Sutton‘s president perceived Sutton‘s role solely to be that of a middleman required to 
qualify the transaction for Federal tax purposes.‖); id. at 1055 (―As Sutton‘s president 
testified, Sutton was inserted into the transaction solely to make the transaction appear as a 
multiple-party transaction for Federal tax purposes . . . . Sutton‘s blink-of-an-eye interest in 
the transaction must be disregarded.‖); Bussing, 88 T.C. at 457-58 (noting that ―Sutton was 
inserted in the transaction . . . to facilitate the appearance of satisfying the ‗at risk‘ provision 
of section 465 and to make the transaction appear to be a genuine multiple party transaction 
for purposes of applying Frank Lyon,‖ and finding that the transaction was ―not a genuine 
multiple-party transaction, but a . . . sale-leaseback pursuant to which the respective lease 
and debt obligations flow between only two parties‖). 
 130. Compare IES Indus., 253 F.3d at 355-56 (finding trades at issue were at arm‘s 
length and between unrelated parties; taxpayer wins), with Bussing, 89 T.C. at 1055-56 
(finding third party disregarded as ―straw man‖; taxpayer loses). 
 131. In applying the economic substance doctrine, some courts have asked whether the 
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On the other hand, such practical economic effects could be illusory, or 
could be undercut by unwritten understandings or relationships that escape 
the gaze of the observer.
132
  A transaction with a third party might create 
genuine risk for the taxpayer, suggesting the presence of economic effects 
or substance.
133
  On the other hand, third-party transactions and agreements 
may have been used to eliminate risk.
134
  Finally, the fact that a transaction 
has taken place between putatively unrelated parties might suggest that the 
pricing of the deal (which, of course, impacts the amount of tax benefits 
realized)
135
 was at arm‘s length and at fair value.
136
  However, as a result of 
 
transaction has any ―economic effects other than the creation of tax benefits‖ or ―practical 
economic effects.‖  E.g., Kirchman, 862 F.2d at 1492; Hutchinson v. United States, 90-2 
USTC 50,573 (D. Or. 1990).  ―Practical economic effects‖ generally means the existence or 
creation of real legal obligations as a result of the transaction.  Hutchinson, 90-2 USTC at 
85,965-66; see also Sochin v. Comm‘r, 843 F.2d 351, 354 (9th Cir. 1988); Thompson v. 
Comm‘r, 631 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1980).  Applying this formulation of the doctrine, 
courts can and have analyzed the presence of unrelated party obligees as a feature that 
suggests or creates the requisite economic effects.  See, e.g., United Parcel Serv. of Am., 254 
F.3d at 1018 (―The kind of ‗economic effects‘ required to entitle a transaction to respect in 
taxation include the creation of genuine obligations enforceable by an unrelated party.‖). 
 132. See, e.g., AWG Leasing Trust, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 985-90 (finding that the way the 
economics of the deal were set up meant that there was very little chance that the third-party 
participant would exercise the ―service contract‖ option, and that this effectively amounted 
to an almost certain exercise by the third party of the ―fixed purchase option‖); ACM P‟ship, 
73 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2194 (discussing all the reasons taxpayer considered the foreign bank 
counterparty to be ―well suited‖ and ―friendly‖  as a partner).  See also Raskolnikov, 
Relational Tax Planning, supra note 10, at 1199 (risk analysis of tax planning‘s use of 
unwritten understandings); cf. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. 581-82 (rejecting the government‘s 
position–which looked at taxpayer‘s presence on counterparty‘s board of directors and other 
factors as suggesting that the counterparty was the true owner of the property–as 
―theorizing‖). 
 133. One of the ways courts may analyze a third party‘s participation is to look at the 
risk created or taken on in the transaction.  In this regard, transactions with third-party 
participants may be seen as holding more risk.  See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp., 277 
F.3d at 783-84, 787 (finding that despite the parties‘ attempts to minimize risk of loss, 
sufficient risk existed; relying in part on the fact that the transaction occurred in an open 
market between independent parties where prices could change, rather than ―in an 
environment controlled by Compaq or its agents‖).  The relationship between ―practical 
economic effects‖ and ―risk of loss‖ can be seen, for example, in the Eleventh Circuit‘s 
opinion in United Parcel Serv., 254 F.3d at 1018. 
 134. E.g., AWG Leasing Trust, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 981, 983-85; Wells Fargo, 91 Fed. Cl. 
at 48-50, 53-54 (2010). 
 135. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 136. See, e.g., Newman, 902 F.2d at 163 (observing that there was ―no question‖ that the 
independent parties ―dealt at arm‘s length‖); Krause, 99 T.C. 132 (denying limited 
partnership investors‘ deductions for losses incurred from partnership investments where 
debt obligations of the partnerships were not based on arm‘s length transactions and resulted 
from excessive amounts paid for technology licenses).  Correspondingly, some courts have 
viewed transactions between related parties with suspicion as not having been negotiated at 
arm‘s length.  See, e.g., E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 608 F.2d 445 (Ct. 
Cl. 1979) (finding IRS‘s reallocation under I.R.C. § 482 of substantial part of foreign 
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incentives to collude (see Part IV.A), this is not always the case.
137
 
The potentially opposite significance(s) of a third party‘s presence or 
actions in shelter cases means that it is impossible to evaluate whether a 
transaction has substance without looking in great detail at the nature of the 
relationship between the third party and the taxpayer.  And, as discussed, 
the relationship between the taxpayer and third party extends beyond the 
boundaries of the transaction(s) at issue to include the legal and non-legal 
statuses and actions of the parties at present and over time. 
The good news, in terms of the ability of judicial doctrines to handle 
increased relationality, is that the case law shows that judges are capable of 
applying, and are in fact applying, these analytically opposite constructs in 
the context of deciding tax shelter cases.
138
  Moreover, these constructs and 
analyses are often discussed and applied by judges in the process of 
applying anti-abuse doctrines.
139
  This shows that courts do recognize that 
they are performing analysis of third-party relationships when determining 
whether certain arrangements have ―substance‖ and should be respected. 
The bad news is that courts are not fully consistent in their evaluations 
of third-party relationships, both in terms of transparency of process and 
depth of analysis.
140
  While many courts do implicitly or explicitly consider 
the analytical impacts of third-party relationships in applying the judicial 
anti-abuse doctrines to determine whether a transaction has substance, not 
all courts apply a consistent methodology or a consistent degree of 
attention to making such evaluation.
141
  This may reflect the continued 
 
subsidiary‘s income to parent was not unreasonable); contra U.S. Gypsum Co. v. United 
States, 452 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1971), aff‟g in part 304 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (holding 
administrative ruling allocating income between parent and subsidiary on ground that 
shipping rates charged by subsidiary to parent was not arm‘s length was unreasonable, 
arbitrary, and capricious). 
 137. See Lederman I, supra note 10, at 724-33 (distinguishing ―zero sum‖ situations 
from situations involving ―manufactured surplus‖). 
 138. See supra notes 128–137. 
 139. See supra notes 128–137. 
 140. See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum, 452 F.2d at 448 (―Whether the district court addressed itself 
to precisely the proper issue [i.e., the question of whether pricing was at arm‘s length] is not 
free from doubt.‖). 
 141. Compare United Parcel Serv. of Am., 254 F.3d 1014 and Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. 561  
(cases in which presence of third party seemed to be enough), with ACM P‟ship, 73 T.C.M. 
(CCH) at 2214 (rejecting taxpayer‘s argument that ―all partnership transactions were 
negotiated at arm‘s length, priced at fair market value, conducted in accordance with 
standard commercial practices, and had practical effects wholly apart from their tax 
consequences‖), Boca Investerings P‟ship, 314 F.3d at 632 (rejecting taxpayer‘s contention 
that it was sufficient that ―the parties ‗intended to, and did, organize Boca as a partnership to 
share the income, expenses, gains and losses from Boca‘s investments‘‖), and Wells Fargo, 
91 Fed. Cl. at 49 (noting that pricing was not at ―fair market value‖ despite appraisal, but 
that the taxpayer, appraisers and arrangers had colluded to increase the property‘s valuation 
in order to maximize tax benefits). 
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resonance of the Frank Lyon presumption in favor of respecting 
transactions between multiple unrelated parties.
142
 
For example, in United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001), the Eleventh Circuit relied 
on the Frank Lyon presumption and ignored the reality of the underlying 
relationships between the parties in reversing the tax court and holding for 
the taxpayer.
143
  As part of its package-shipping business, United Parcel 
Service (―UPS‖) collected ―excess value charges‖ (―EVCs‖) from 
customers in exchange for insuring package values in excess of $100.
144
  
UPS decided to lessen its tax liability by restructuring its excess value 
insurance program to have an overseas affiliate, Overseas Partners, Ltd. 
(―OPL‖), provide the insurance, instead of UPS providing the insurance 
itself.
145
  To execute its plan, UPS purchased an insurance contract from a 
third-party insurer, National Union, paying as the premium the EVCs 
collected from UPS customers.
146
  National Union assumed the risk of 
damage to shipments in excess of $100.
147
  National Union then entered 
into a reinsurance contract with OPL, the UPS overseas affiliate almost all 
of whose shares were held by UPS shareholders.
148
  Under the reinsurance 
contract, National Union paid to OPL the EVC premiums it had been paid 
by UPS, minus commissions, fees, and excise taxes.
149
  In this way, UPS 
was able to avoid reporting revenue from the EVCs on its tax return.
150
 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the tax court holding and held for 
UPS.
151
  After noting that the ―economic effects‖ required for a transaction 
to be respected ―include the creation of genuine obligations enforceable by 
an unrelated party,‖ the court noted that the ―real insurance policy‖ 
between UPS and National Union was ―a genuine obligation‖ and that the 
―reinsurance treaty‖ between National Union and OPL, ―while certainly 
reducing the odds of loss,‖ did not ―completely foreclose the risk of loss 
because reinsurance treaties . . . are susceptible to default.‖
152
  Finally, the 
court noted that even if National Union were to be disregarded as a 
―conduit,‖ it was still true that OPL was ―an independently taxable entity 
that [was] not under UPS‘s control‖ and that ―UPS really did lose the 
 
 142. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 143. United Parcel Serv. of Am., 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 262. 
 144. Id. at 1016. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 1017. 
 151. Id. at 1016. 
 152. Id. at 1018. 
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stream of income it had earlier reaped from excess-value charges.‖
153
 
The United Parcel Service decision is a classic example of a court 
respecting a multiple-party transaction without adequate further analysis.  
The fact that the court explicitly relied on Frank Lyon in its analysis 
supports this Article‘s observation that the Frank Lyon presumption acts as 
a countervailing force that undermines the effectiveness of judicial anti-
abuse doctrines in the battle to probe the true substance of a transactional 
relationship.
154
  The United Parcel Service court also did not fully assess 
the realities of the underlying relationship between the parties to the 
transaction, most notably by treating OPL as an ―independent‖ entity when 
in reality it was controlled by UPS shareholders who were also employees 
and thus were extremely unlikely to default on the reinsurance contract.
155
  
The court‘s inability (or unwillingness) to see past a relationship that was, 
on the surface, an arm‘s length one, and to examine the true substance of 
what the connections between the taxpayers and the holders really meant, 
demonstrates the inadequacy of the traditional doctrines in probing the full 
extent and impact of such relationships.  What is needed is a more robust 
approach to interrogating relationality, beyond the mere analysis of pre-tax 
profit, ―genuine obligations,‖ business motivations, or risk. 
It bears mentioning that the United Parcel Service dissent agreed with 
the majority with respect to the need for ―economic effects other than the 
creation of tax benefits‖ but disagreed with the majority‘s risk assessment, 
correctly finding that the insurer‘s exposure to risk of loss was 
―infinitesimal‖ and that the transaction therefore lacked economic 
substance or business purpose.
156
  Thus, the dissent appeared to make a 
more thorough and accurate analysis of the actual economics of the 
relationship between the parties than the majority opinion.  If the United 
Parcel Service court had placed less reliance on the Frank Lyon case and 
had performed a more relationally attuned analysis, perhaps it would have 
reached a more economically rational conclusion. 
In summary, the failure of certain courts to closely scrutinize the 
relationships underlying a transaction is problematic because the 
indeterminate significance of third-party relationships in shelter cases 
demands an in-depth analysis of such relationships, notwithstanding Frank 
Lyon‘s suggestion otherwise.
157
  While it is encouraging that the tools for 
evaluating relationships are embedded in judicial anti-abuse doctrines and 
 
 153. Id. at 1019. 
 154. Id. at 1018 (citing Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 582-83).  The United Parcel Service 
court could instead have conducted a more comprehensive analysis of the risk of loss and 
might well have concluded that this risk was negligible had it done so.  Another example of 
a court applying the Frank Lyon presumption is IES Industries, 253 F.3d at 355-56. 
 155. United Parcel Serv., 254 F.3d at 1019. 
 156. Id. at 1021 (Ryskamp, J., dissenting). 
 157. Wolfman, supra note 94, at 1087-88. 
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are frequently applied, more consistent and closer scrutiny of today‘s 
sophisticated, hidden, and increasingly complex relationships is required in 
applying these doctrines. 
C. The Importance of Judicial Narratives 
It may also be argued that just because some courts are not explicitly 
discussing third-party relationships in their opinions, this does not mean 
that they are not sufficiently considering and analyzing these relationships.  
From a results-oriented perspective, the fact that the IRS has emerged 
victorious in several major tax shelter cases may prove that there is no 
issue.
158
  However, there are three problems with this line of thinking.  
First, it is clear from looking at cases like United Parcel Service and IES 
Industries (both taxpayer victories) that the Frank Lyon presumption in 
favor of respecting transactions with unrelated parties is alive and well, 
notwithstanding the actual content of the underlying relationships.
159
  
Second, it is no secret that the complexity of the subject matter and the 
realities of asymmetric information and unbalanced resources between the 
parties in litigation (that is, the taxpayer and the IRS) mean that it is not a 
trivial matter for courts to appreciate the full extent and implications of the 
third-party relationality that goes on in shelter cases.  This suggests that 
more can be done to enhance judicial comprehension.
160
  This point is 
developed further in Part IV.A.
161
  Finally, in addition to concerns about 
analytical consistency, concerns about transparency are also important 
because the opaqueness of complex relationships, when paired with the 
lack of explicit judicial discussion, renders such relationships less visible 
than relationships and their effects in other legal spheres.
162
  Rather than 
perpetuating dominant rule-based discourses and sublimating discourses 
 
 158. Of course, the IRS has not always emerged the victor in the past, and it is unlikely 
that the Service will win all battles in the future.  See Steve R. Johnson, Tax Shelters:  Up 
Off the Canvas?, 29 A.B.A. SEC. TAX‘N NEWS Q. NO. 2, at 1 (2010) (outlining the back-and-
forth history of tax shelter battles between taxpayers and the IRS, and noting that ―a 
pendulum moves in one direction only for a space, after which it reverses its course‖). 
 159. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Frank Lyon presumption and its effects); see also 
supra notes 140-156 and accompanying text (discussing subsequent case law that reflects 
the Frank Lyon presumption). 
 160. See, e.g., Wolfman, note 94, at 1092 (noting ―inadequacy of the government‘s 
advocacy‖); id. at 1100 (―In an environment of infinitely diverse and complex transactions 
governed by an arcane Code, the Court cannot devote the time necessary to become 
expert.‖).  See also sources cited infra note 228 and accompanying text (discussing 
information and other asymmetries between taxpayer and IRS). 
 161. See discussion infra Part IV.A. (discussing adverse impacts of third-party 
relationships on transparency and observability). 
 162. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (contrasting, as an example, scrutiny of 
same-sex marriages). 
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about the relational nature of tax planning, judges and judicial opinions 
should help increase transparency and awareness around the use of 
relationships in tax planning by bringing discussions and evaluations about 
this relationality into plain sight. 
 
* * * * * 
 
To sum up the discussion thus far:  judicial anti-abuse analysis is, at 
its core, relationship analysis.  Judicially applied doctrines (such as the 
economic substance doctrine) do contain the constructs necessary to 
analyze and evaluate third-party relationships.  And many courts are 
applying these constructs to deeply probe the nature and content of 
relationships between taxpayers and other persons in deciding shelter cases.  
Yet problems remain with our current applications of these anti-abuse 
rules. 
First, judicial anti-abuse doctrines are fundamentally artificial and 
limited constructs.  They are particularly weak in analyzing relationships 
that last over time and span beyond the discretely defined tax deal that is 
before the courts.  Furthermore, judicial evaluations of complex 
relationships between parties vary in robustness.  In particular, some courts 
appear still to be swayed by the Frank Lyon presumption of respecting 
relationships if they are between unrelated parties.  These factors are 
compounded by the existence of information asymmetries that favor 
sophisticated taxpayers at the expense of courts and the IRS and the 
evolution of the legal and societal landscape that has rendered the 
relationships being evaluated much more complex than they were when the 
judicial doctrines were originally conceived.  As a result, in determining 
whether a transaction has substance, some judicial investigations of 
relationships remain inadequate. 
Finally, even where judges do implicitly scrutinize third-party 
relationships in a thorough manner, judicial narratives about the nature and 
complexity of such relationships are lacking.  Explicit judicial discussions 
of the relationships that facilitate tax transactions, and  explanations of the 
analytical steps courts are taking in parsing such relationships, are 
important.  Such discussions and explanations should be encouraged 
because they have the power to raise public awareness about the roles of 
relationality in sophisticated tax planning and encourage judicial 
accountability.
163
 
 
 
 163. See discussion infra Part V.A. (advocating for explicit judicial narratives 
concerning relationality). 
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IV. TWO OTHER HARMS OF THIRD-PARTY RELATIONSHIPS:  
EVIDENTIARY CONCEALMENT AND THE WARPING OF DOCTRINE 
In addition to their vital importance in determining whether a given 
transaction has sufficient substance or risk to be respected, the presence of 
third parties in tax shelter transactions have two other distinct impacts on 
the outcome and process of tax shelter litigation.  First, far from indicating 
transparent dealings, such relationships may, in fact, create incentives that 
detract from what courts and others are able to observe in litigated shelter 
cases, leading to decreased transparency and altered litigation outcomes.  
Second, the increased role and presence of third parties has led to doctrinal 
confusion in the application of the economic substance inquiry in shelter 
cases, resulting in actual, unintended modifications of the doctrine in ways 
that ultimately compromise their effectiveness.  Specifically, it has led to 
confused applications of the business purpose prong of the economic 
substance inquiry.  This confusion is particularly pronounced in the context 
of pass-though entities. 
A. Potentially Adverse Impacts on Transparency and Observability 
An important way in which relationships with third parties may 
impact process and outcomes in shelter litigation is through the effects that 
such relationships may have on what judges, counsel, commentators, and 
other spectators are able to observe in a tax shelter case.  As discussed, it is 
tempting to assume that the presence of third parties in a transaction is a 
more ―favorable‖ fact than if the transaction were between, say, a parent 
and a controlled subsidiary, on the theory that the deal is somehow more 
transparent.
164
  However, this is not always the case.  As other scholars 
have pointed out, even in the non-shelter context, not all third-party 
relationships are structured in ways that incentivize openness and 
transparency; in some situations, third parties have a clear incentive to 
collude with a taxpayer to facilitate tax avoidance.
165
  In general, however, 
the way in which third-party relationships affect the pragmatics of actual 
tax shelter litigation has been underexplored in the academic literature. 
In the context of tax shelter litigation, it is important to realize that 
parties with whom a taxpayer has a personal relationship or an ongoing 
 
 164. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv. of Am., 254 F.3d 1014 (wherein court made just such 
an assumption). 
 165. See, e.g., Lederman I, supra note 10, at 724 (―In a multitude of contexts, third 
parties may actually foster evasion, colluding with the taxpayer in abusive transactions.‖); 
see also Phillip A. Curry, Claire Hill & Francesco Parisi, Creating Failures in the Market 
for Tax Planning, 26 VA. TAX REV. 943 (2007) (discussing ways the government can cause 
the tax planning market that exists between participants to fail). 
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business relationship (or who hope to have such a relationship) may have 
an incentive to cooperate with the taxpayer in presenting a tax transaction 
in the best possible light.  For example, a counterparty to a shelter 
transaction that has an ongoing business relationship with the taxpayer 
might be reluctant to cooperate with the IRS, in order to preserve that 
ongoing relationship.  Such incentives that detract from cooperation may 
create problems for commentators, observers, and decision makers in 
shelter cases, even in situations where cooperating third parties are 
performing fairly innocuous functions.
166
  So, for example, a third party 
with an interest in preserving an ongoing relationship may be reticent to 
provide evidence that a tax-driven deal was contemplated before a certain 
time, if such evidence undercuts the factual narrative the taxpayer is 
attempting to present at trial.  These dynamics may have consequences for 
a court‘s ability to determine the true motivations underlying a transaction 
or the existence of planning or premeditation with respect to a transaction.  
Stated differently, motivations associated with ongoing relationship 
creation and maintenance, even with respect to relationships between 
supposedly arm‟s length parties, may undermine the interest in robust 
discovery and disclosure of all relevant facts in trial proceedings.
167
 
The impact of cooperative and ongoing relationships between the 
taxpayer and third-party participants may, for example, show up in a third 
party‘s less-than-forthcoming response to being subpoenaed in a shelter 
case.
168
  Such third parties are required to respond to subpoenas of 
documents or persons.  However, incentives of a third party to collude or 
cooperate with a taxpayer (or to support the factual narrative put forth by 
the taxpayer in the interests of ongoing goodwill) may put added pressure 
on the subpoena issuer to be extremely nuanced in determining how the 
subpoena should be crafted and what documents or information to demand.  
Such incentives may also create difficulties for the Service in eliciting 
information from third-party witnesses called under the subpoena.
169
  Such 
third-party resistance in effect forces the subpoena issuer or witness 
 
 166. Even third parties serving relatively innocuous functions that have an interest in 
preserving longer-term business relationships (e.g., sellers and buyers of property in a 
transaction) might have an incentive to be less than forthcoming with information. 
 167. But cf. Lederman II, supra note 15, at 1739 (―[I]nformation reporting is of most use 
where the possibility of collusion is relatively small.  This suggests that contexts involving 
parties who generally act at arm‘s length . . . are more suitable for information reporting 
than are contexts involving related parties (such as family members).‖). 
 168. See I.R.C. § 7456 (2006) (subpoena powers of U.S. Tax Court).  See also TAX CT. 
R. 147 (subpoena rules for the U.S. Tax Court); FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (subpoena rules for 
federal district courts); CL. CT. R. 45 (subpoena rules for the Court of Federal Claims); 
GERALD A. KAFKA & RITA A. CAVANAGH, LITIGATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL TAX 
CONTROVERSIES ¶ 1.08[2] (comparing U.S. Tax Court‘s nationwide subpoena rule with 
more circumscribed rule for federal districts courts and the court of federal claims). 
 169. See generally sources cited supra note 168. 
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examiner to be extra careful in detailing the requested documents or 
testimony, even assuming 100% honesty on the part of the responder.
170
  
This is not a good thing because subpoenas of non-taxpayer parties are an 
important tool used to obtain information about the surrounding context 
and relationships in a tax litigation proceeding and to verify taxpayer 
claims.
171
  Third-party reticence in information sharing can increase 
litigation costs, waste resources, and exacerbate already existing 
information asymmetries and disparities in resource availability between 
the IRS and the taxpayer.
172
 
The impact of a third-party relationship on the amount of information 
to which judges and the IRS have access in tax litigation, and on how such 
information is filtered and presented, is hard to quantify.  The evidence for 
this is buried in the experiential knowledge of tax litigation practitioners 
and is for the most part hidden from the purview of academic scholars.  
However, as any experienced tax litigator knows, the impact of such 
relationships is undeniable.  The motivations of parties in relation to each 
other and the litigants‘ assessments of the likelihood and ease of obtaining 
evidence from various players are significant factors in how a case gets 
presented and litigated.  Indeed, such hidden motivations play a vital role in 
determining whether a case gets litigated.  Difficulties in obtaining 
information from third-party participants to a transaction may lead to a 
greater likelihood of pre-trial settlements or a more generous settlement in 
favor of taxpayers than might otherwise occur.
173
 
In sum, the broader question raised by the presence of ongoing 
relationships with third parties, beyond the notion of ―substance,‖ is how 
judges can possibly be sure that the record that they are observing and the 
narratives to which they are privy (and upon which the litigants no doubt 
base their litigation and settlement strategies) are complete, fair, and 
reflective of all of the incentives underlying the transaction.  Furthermore, 
how can they be certain that the record accurately describes all of the 
events that actually took place between the parties to a transaction?
174
  The 
 
 170. See generally sources cited supra note 168. 
 171. See generally sources cited supra note 168. 
 172. Lederman II, supra note 15; David Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 
331 (2006) (discussing ―structural imbalance‖ between government and private tax bar in 
terms of information, expertise, and numbers, and proposing solutions). 
 173. The nature of the relationships between the parties, whether they are competitive or 
cooperative and whether collaboration or collusion is present, may, for example, impact 
matters of trial strategy, including which witnesses get called, whether expert witnesses are 
used, and which arguments are emphasized.  See generally John Herbert Tovey, Preparing a 
Federal Income Tax Case for Trial, 20 AM. JUR. TRIALS 255 (1973). 
 174. As discussed in Part IV.B.2, infra, in ASA Investerings, the tax court seemed aware 
that the third-party foreign bank participant sought to strengthen its relationship with the 
corporation seeking to offset its gains by participating in the tax shelter transaction at issue.  
76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325, 327 (1998) (noting that ―ABN and [taxpayer] already had a lending 
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existence of these evidentiary issues may adversely impact a court‘s ability 
to properly apply traditional doctrines and thus may compromise their 
ability to fully evaluate the facts and the merits of the tax deal.  To make 
fully informed judgments about what they are seeing, judges need to 
understand the hidden dynamics of the underlying relationships between 
the parties to a transaction.  Some relationships facilitate transparency and 
honest disclosure; others demonstrate the reverse incentives.
175
  In cases 
where the relationships impede cooperation at trial, particularly where 
judges are unaware of these relationships, this has the potential to detract 
from the soundness of the ultimate holding or other resolution of the case.  
To this point, courts have not yet come up with a systematic approach to 
guard against these problems. 
B. Impacts on the Content of Judicial Doctrine:  Obfuscation of Doctrine 
Taxpayer relationships with third parties have also had problematic 
impacts on the content of substantive doctrine.  Most notably, the 
proliferation of these relationships, and the evolving forms they take, have 
created confusion in the application of the business purpose analysis in tax 
transactions.  At one extreme, some courts have moved toward relying on 
the business motivations, profit potential, economic effects, and risk of the 
unrelated party participants, rather than the taxpayers themselves, in 
determining whether a transaction has economic substance.
176
  At the other 
extreme, others have held that the business purpose of non-taxpayer parties 
has no relevance in determining whether a transaction should be respected 
for tax purposes.
177
  In cases involving pass-through entities, courts have 
had particular difficulty distinguishing between the taxpayer and the third-
party participant in determining whose business motivations should 
―count.‖
178
 
 
 
relationship, but ABN believed it could strengthen that relationship by participating in the 
venture and being a compliant partner‖); ASA Investerings P‘ship v. Comm‘r, 201 F.3d 
505, 514 n.6.  See also Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning, supra note 10, at 1258 
(―Courts are already more suspicious of tax benefits arising from relationships that have 
higher levels of trust.‖).  The question is whether courts are also aware that the nature of the 
underlying commercial dynamics between the parties also has effects on the procedural and 
evidentiary aspects of tax shelter trials. 
 175. This point has been argued by other scholars.  E.g., Lederman I, supra note 10. 
 176. See Newman, 902 F.2d at 163 (crediting non-tax motivation of third-party trucking 
company). 
 177. See Coleman v. Comm‘r, 16 F.3d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding the non-
taxpaying party‘s motivation not relevant). 
 178. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
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1. Confusion in Whether to Allow Bootstrapping of Unrelated Party 
Business Motivations 
 An extreme example of a case that has moved toward ―counting‖ the 
third party‘s business purposes in finding that a transaction had substance is 
Newman v. Commissioner.
179
  In Newman, the individual taxpayer claimed 
an investment tax credit (―ITC‖) based on his ownership of a tractor-trailer 
truck, which was used by a third-party trucking company.
180
  The legal 
issue boiled down to whether the taxpayer had leased the truck to the 
trucking company (in which case the taxpayer would not have been entitled 
to the ITC) or whether the relationship was one of owner-independent 
contractor.
181
  The court applied the economic substance inquiry in making 
its determination.
182
  In analyzing whether there existed the requisite non-
tax business purpose for engaging in the transaction, the court found that 
despite the tax court‘s finding that the taxpayer was not motivated by non-
tax considerations, this did not compel the legal conclusion that the 
transaction lacked a business purpose.
183
  Instead, the court characterized 
the Frank Lyon decision as holding that ―as long as one party is motivated 
by non-tax considerations, even if it is not the taxpayer, the form of the 
agreement will satisfy [the business purpose] factor.‖
184
  The court 
proceeded to find that the third-party trucking company had non-tax 
motivations for entering into the transaction, and that the business purpose 
requirement was therefore satisfied.
185
  This tendency to take third-party 
business purposes into account has been echoed elsewhere.
186
 
The bootstrapping of third-party business purposes described in this 
Part is arguably another echo of the Frank Lyon over-reliance on the 
motivations and participation of unrelated parties.
187
  At the same time, not 
all courts have allowed such bootstrapping.  Some have treated the business 
purposes of a third party as irrelevant in determining whether a transaction 
had substance for tax purposes.  For instance, in Coleman v. Commissioner, 
a sale-leaseback case, the court ignored the business motivations of the 
seller-lessee (which claimed that it entered into the transaction because of 
 
 179. 902 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1990), vacating 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 748 (1988). 
 180. Id. at 160. 
 181. Id. at 162. 
 182. Id. at 163 (citing Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 583-84 (1978)). 
 183. Id. at 163. 
 184. Id. (citing Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 576). 
 185. Id. 
 186. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.  See also Reply Br. of Resp‘t at 291-93, Santa 
Monica Pictures, L.L.C. v. Comm‘r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157 (2005) (No. 6163-03) (citing 
and applying Newman, 902 F.2d 159); cf. Wells Fargo, 91 Fed. Cl. at 83 (finding a non-tax 
business purpose lacking by examining effects on both taxpayer and counterparty). 
 187. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
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cash needs to remain financially viable), noting that the relevant motive 
was that of the lessor-partnership of which the taxpayer was a partner.
188
  
This is the opposite of the approach taken by the courts in Newman and 
Frank Lyon, which allowed the taxpayer in those cases to ―borrow‖ 
business purpose from third parties in order to meet the requirements of 
economic substance.
189
 
2. Confusion in Application to Pass-through Entities 
The business purpose analysis runs into related difficulties in cases 
involving pass-through entity taxpayers.  In such situations, the question 
that arises is whether the business purpose analysis should occur at the 
entity level or at the level of the respective owners of the entity.  For 
example, if the entity is a partnership, and if the analysis looks at the 
partners of the partnership, bootstrapping might inadvertently occur 
because the partners may include both the party ultimately attempting to 
minimize its tax liability or claim a tax benefit and a facilitating ―third 
party‖ partner.
190
 
The contingent installment sales cases, which were constructed to 
shelter capital gains of corporate taxpayers by employing the operation of 
the contingent installment sales regulations, provide an example of the 
inconsistency and confusion that comes with evaluating a third-party 
relationship‘s impact on the business purpose analysis.
191
  An examination 
of these cases shows that even within the same ―family‖ of tax shelter 
cases, different courts give the motivations of these participants different 
weights in determining the bona fides of a given transaction.  As discussed 
in Part II.A,
192
 these transactions involved the formation of a partnership 
between a domestic and a foreign partner.
193
  Using contributions from the 
partners, the partnership would purchase property (private placement 
notes), hold it for a short period of time, and then sell the property in 
exchange for a large, immediate cash payment and small future contingent 
payments (LIBOR notes).
194
  This sale of private placement notes for cash 
 
 188. 16 F.3d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 1994) (―Although [the seller-lessee‘s] motive appears 
genuine, we place little significance on this factor because [the lessor limited partnership‘s] 
motive is the relevant one.‖). 
 189. Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 576-78; Newman, 902 F.2d at 163. 
 190. See, e.g., ACM P‟ship, 157 F.3d 231 (partners were a company seeking to generate 
capital losses and a ―facilitating‖ Dutch bank). 
 191. Id.; Boca Investerings, 314 F.3d 625; Saba, 273 F.3d 1135; ASA Investerings, 201 
F.3d 505. 
 192. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. 
 193. Boca Investerings, 314 F.3d at 628; Saba, 273 F.3d at 1136; ASA Investerings, 201 
F.3d at 506; ACM, 157 F.3d at 234-35. 
 194. Boca Investerings, 314 F.3d at 628-29; Saba, 273 F.3d at 1138; ASA Investerings, 
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and LIBOR notes would trigger the application of the ratable basis 
recovery rule in the regulations.
195
  This rule would allow present year gain 
to be allocated to the foreign partner, while future yearly losses would be 
allocated to the domestic partner to offset that domestic partner‘s gains 
from other activities after the foreign partner‘s withdrawal from the 
partnership.
196
  Merrill Lynch, the promoter, was involved not merely in 
structuring the transactions but also in seeking out the foreign partner, 
ABN Bank based in the Netherlands, to participate in the transaction, and 
matching willing taxpayers with ABN Bank.
197
 
The CINS courts were inconsistent in how they applied the business 
purpose prong of the economic substance doctrine with respect to the 
participation of ABN Bank.  For example, in ASA Investerings, the tax 
court found that the partnership (ASA) was a sham partnership, focusing on 
ABN Bank‘s lack of business purpose rather than on AlliedSignal, the 
entity seeking to offset its gains.  The tax court first determined that the 
issue was ―whether AlliedSignal and ABN intended to join together in the 
present conduct of an enterprise.‖
198
  The court then found that the 
partnership was not a true partnership because the partners had ―divergent 
business goals‖—AlliedSignal‘s goal was to generate capital losses, while 
ABN Bank‘s ―sole purpose‖ for entering into the partnership was 
―receiving its specified return.‖
199
  The court proceeded to look more 
closely at ABN‘s participation, noting that ―ABN [had no] profit potential 
beyond its specified return and did not have any intention of being 
 
201 F.3d at 508; ACM, 157 F.3d at 235-36. 
 195. I.R.C. § 453 (2006); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453–1(c)(3)(i) (1981). 
 196. Boca Investerings, 314 F.3d at 627; Saba, 273 F.3d at 1136; ASA Investerings, 201 
F.3d at 507—08; ACM, 157 F.3d at 237. 
 197. Saba, 273 F.3d at 1136, 1138; ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d at 508; ACM, 157 F.3d at 
235, 235 n. 5; Saba P‘ship v. Comm‘r, Nos. 1470-97, 1471-97, 1999 WL 974834, at *4, *8-
9 (U.S. Tax Ct. Oct. 27, 1999); ASA Investerings, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325, 326-27 (1998); 
ACM P‟ship, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2194.  The CINS cases represent a set of tax shelter 
transactions whose success is dependent upon the participation of unrelated party 
participants.  See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.  There were two clear junctures 
at which unrelated party participation was instrumental in triggering the desired tax 
consequences.  First, the acquisition of the private placement notes from unrelated parties 
and their almost immediate sale to other unrelated parties partially in exchange for a 
contingent instrument was the triggering tax event that allowed the Section 453 regulations 
to be applied in the first place.  Second, the participation and subsequent withdrawal of a tax 
neutral foreign partner (ABN Bank) in each of these partnerships was essential in order for 
the gain from the PPN-for-cash-and-LIBOR-notes exchange to be allocated to that foreign 
partner with the subsequent loss being allocated to the taxpayer trying to offset its capital 
gains.  The analysis of third parties by the CINS courts focused on the second juncture 
rather than the first:  the participation of ABN Bank, the tax neutral foreign partner. 
 198. ASA Investerings, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 333 (citing Comm‘r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 
733, 742 (1949) and Maiatico v. Comm‘r, 183 F.2d 836, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1950)). 
 199. Id. 
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AlliedSignal‘s partner.‖
200
  The court also noted that ―ABN would not bear 
any loss relating to the PPN sale‖ and ―ABN was a compliant and 
accommodating party, which was chosen for the venture because it was 
willing to serve at AlliedSignal‘s direction.‖
201
  By focusing on ABN Bank, 
the court concluded that these features were ―contrary to the characteristics 
of a bona fide partnership‖ and that the partnership was therefore a sham 
entity.
202
 
Even though it ultimately affirmed the tax court‘s determination that 
the partnership was a sham and that the parties did not intend to join 
together to conduct non-tax avoidance business activities, the court of 
appeals in ASA Investerings found it ―curious‖ and ―puzzling‖ that the tax 
court‘s focus was on ABN‘s intentions.  The appeals court found this 
curious because ―the absence of a nontax business purpose was even 
clearer for AlliedSignal‖ and ―AlliedSignal . . . was the driving force and . . 
. focused on tax minimization to the virtual exclusion of ordinary business 
goals.‖
203
  Thus, unlike the tax court, the appeals court thought that the 
focus of the sham partnership inquiry should be on AlliedSignal, the 
corporation seeking to offset its capital losses, rather than ABN Bank, the 
foreign partner. 
Inconsistency regarding which party to look at in evaluating business 
purpose was also evident in Boca Investerings.
204
  In determining whether 
the partnership was a sham entity, the court of appeals in Boca 
Investerings, like the courts in ASA Investerings, looked for the existence of 
a nontax business purpose.
205
  However, the Boca Investerings court 
appeared confused over which party to look at in evaluating the existence 
of such business purpose.  On the one hand, the court implied that the 
existence of nontax business purposes should be determined at the partner 
level, looking at the needs and intentions of both partners.
206
  On the other 
hand, the court‘s analysis of whether a nontax business purpose existed 
focused on American Home Products (AHP)—the partner seeking to offset 
capital losses.
207
  After analyzing AHP‘s business purposes, the appeals 
 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 334-35. 
 202. Id. at 335. 
 203. ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d at 513, 515. 
 204. See generally Boca Investerings, 314 F.3d 625. 
 205. Id. at 630 (―As we noted in Saba Partnership, ‗ASA makes clear that the absence of 
a nontax business purpose is fatal to the argument that the Commissioner should respect an 
entity for federal tax purposes.‘‖) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 206. Id. at 631-32 (―In order to satisfy the legal test for this type of partnership, the 
district court must have found a non-tax business purpose need for the partnership in order 
to accomplish the goals of the partners.‖). 
 207. Id. at 631 (―Without a finding on the business need for the partnership from AHP‘s 
standpoint in this transaction, the judgment under review cannot stand.‖). 
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court found that the partnership in question was a sham entity.
208
  By way 
of comparison, the district court in Boca Investerings looked at the 
intentions of both AHP and ABN Bank in determining that the partnership 
was not a sham.
209
 
Just as they disagreed with regard to which entity‘s motivations and 
economic effects to focus on in determining whether a CINS partnership 
was a sham, the CINS courts also failed to agree as to whether the 
applicable analysis to these transactions should be a ―sham entity‖ analysis 
or a ―sham transaction‖ analysis.  While some of the CINS courts applied a 
―sham entity‖ analysis, others applied a ―sham transaction‖ analysis, and 
some applied both.
210
  The CINS courts even appeared to disagree on 
whether the sham entity and sham transaction analyses yielded different 
results.
211
 
The determination of whether to apply a ―sham transaction‖ or a 
―sham entity‖ analysis is significant because application of the sham entity 
analysis allowed some CINS courts to look through the entity to the 
intentions of the partners in determining whether the entity was a sham.  
For example, the fact that it was performing a sham entity analysis led the 
ASA Investerings tax court to look at the divergent business goals of ABN 
and AlliedSignal.
212
  Notably, the district court in Boca Investerings, which 
performed both a sham transaction and a sham partnership analysis, seemed 
 
 208. Id. at 631-32 (―AHP‘s participation in the partnership defies common sense from an 
economic standpoint, since it could have purchased the PPNs and the LIBOR notes directly, 
and avoided millions in transaction costs . . . . In this case, there is no evidence of any need 
for AHP to enter into the . . . partnership with the newly-minted Addiscombe and Syringa in 
order to invest in the LIBOR notes and PPNs.‖). 
 209. Boca Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 369-73 (―AHP would only enter into a 
partnership with a partner or partners with whom AHP would be comfortable, who had 
expertise with respect to the financial instruments . . . and who was financially secure. . . . 
While [the ABN Bank SPCs] hedged their share of the interest-rate risk with respect to the 
LIBOR Notes outside the Partnership, this did not affect the sharing of such risk among the 
partners.‖). 
 210. The appeals court in Boca Investerings, and the tax court and appeals court in ASA 
Investerings, applied a ―sham entity‖ analysis.  Boca Investerings, 314 F.3d at 630; ASA 
Investerings, 201 F.3d at 512; ASA Investerings P‘ship v. Comm‘r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325, 
333-34 (1998).  The tax court and appeals court in ACM Partnership and the tax court in 
Saba Partnership applied a ―sham transaction‖ analysis.  ACM P‟ship, 157 F.3d at 245; 
Saba, at *41-*42; ACM P‟ship, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2214-15 (1997).  The district court 
in Boca Investerings applied both a ―sham entity‖ and a ―sham transaction‖ analysis.  Boca 
Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 364.  The appeals court in Saba Partnership remanded, on 
the theory that both analyses needed to be considered.  Saba, 273 F.3d at 1140-41. 
 211. Compare ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d 505, 512, 512 n.4 (―Although the Tax Court 
said that it would not consider whether the transactions at issue lacked ‗economic 
substance‘ . . . its decision rejecting the bona fides of the partnership was the equivalent of a 
finding that it was . . . a sham.‖), with Saba, 273 F.3d at 1140 (―All parties agree that the 
sham transaction and sham partnership approaches yield different results.‖). 
 212. ASA Investerings, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325, rev‟d, 201 F.3d 505. 
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to take a different approach for each analysis.
213
  In its sham partnership 
analysis, the district court in Boca Investerings looked at the intents of and 
relationships between all of the partners, including the ABN subsidiaries.
214
  
On the other hand, in its sham transaction analysis, the court looked at 
profitability and business purpose almost exclusively from American Home 
Products‘ point of view.
215
  Therefore, the type of analysis the court 
chooses to undertake apparently has a significant effect. 
 
* * * * * 
 
The confusion in ―business purpose‖ jurisprudence, both in cases 
involving pass-through entities and in other cases, is concerning.  Such 
inconsistencies present uncertainty as to the parameters of the business 
purpose doctrine and which version of the business purpose analysis the 
courts will apply.  They also suggest that rogue versions of the doctrine 
may evolve and be applied in inaccurate ways as third-party participation in 
avoidance transactions continues to grow and change.  Such inaccuracies, 
even subtle ones, may undermine the doctrine‘s effectiveness in accurately 
evaluating the transactions and relationships between taxpayers and third 
parties—the very relationships the doctrine is meant to probe. 
V.  BEYOND ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE:  TWO PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS THE 
IMPACTS OF TAXPAYER RELATIONSHIPS IN SHELTER CASES 
Thus far, this Article has summarized the integral roles played by 
relationships and dealings with third parties in the structuring of tax 
transactions and has shown how existing judicial anti-abuse doctrines that 
are applied in shelter cases are, at core, concerned with evaluation of such 
relationships.  However, this Article has also shown that judicial anti-abuse 
doctrines are not cure-alls, that judicial analyses are not uniformly robust, 
and that even courts that perform detailed analyses could do better by 
providing explicit discussions and narratives analyzing such effects.  The 
inadequate application of the traditional doctrines that probe the substance, 
the risk involved, or the economic effects of tax minimization transactions 
is exacerbated in part by two factors:  the continuing resonance of the 
Frank Lyon presumption and the increasing ease of forming more complex 
and sophisticated entities and relationships.
216
 
Furthermore, this Article has shown that the presence of third-party 
relationships in shelter cases causes two other problems:  (1) adverse 
 
 213. Boca Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 364. 
 214. Id. at 367-74. 
 215. Id. at 374-81. 
 216. See discussion supra Parts II.B, III.B. 
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impacts on evidentiary transparency that circumscribe the narratives to 
which courts and other commentators have access in tax litigation 
proceedings and that compromise judicial ability to fully evaluate the 
factual realities of the transactions at issue; and (2) doctrinal obfuscation 
(and correspondingly, subtle modification) in applications of the traditional 
anti-abuse doctrines to complex, relationship-driven transactions. 
To remedy these issues, this section presents two normative proposals.  
First, courts should apply a carefully constructed oppositional choice 
analysis in evaluating third-party relationships and their consequences in 
tax shelter cases in order to offset the problems associated with lack of 
transparency and asymmetric information.  Such an analysis will help 
strengthen traditional doctrines in their analysis of ongoing relationships 
between players.  It will also help alleviate the evidentiary problems caused 
by non-transparent relationships and their accompanying incentives.  
Second, courts should rehabilitate the business purpose doctrine from the 
doctrinal confusion caused by increasingly complex relationships between 
taxpayers and others.  This can help prevent courts from applying 
traditional doctrines in unintended and unanticipated ways that weaken 
their ultimate effectiveness. 
A. The Need for an Explicitly Expressed, Oppositional-Choice Analysis 
of Taxpayer Relationships 
The need for a ―deeper look‖ at the meanings and effects of 
relationships between taxpayers and third parties, in terms of both 
substance and procedure, is central to this Article‘s first proposal.  So, too, 
is the need for clear judicial expression of their evaluations of these 
relationships.  As other scholars have argued, the content of judicial 
opinions is significant for reasons other than simply determining the 
outcome of a case.
217
  Judicial opinion writing in tax shelter cases can and 
should play an active role in guiding judicial choice and in shedding light 
upon the nuances of relationships in shelter cases. 
Since it is generally not feasible to ban business transactions and 
relationship formation outright on an ex ante basis,
218
 this Article suggests a 
 
 217. See Susan Bandes, Searching for Worlds beyond the Canon: Narrative, Rhetoric, 
and Legal Change, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 271, 281 (2003) (―The [judicial] aura of 
authority and inevitability is achieved largely by the very refusal to acknowledge alternative 
viewpoints.‖); Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as 
Informational Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 743, 747 (2006) (―[J]udicial opinions serve as a 
form of informational regulation of judicial behavior.‖).  See also Alex Geisinger, A Belief 
Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35 (2002) (articulating a ―belief 
change‖ theory of how law affects social norms and discussing law‘s ―expressive‖ 
function). 
 218. Some provisions have been enacted to discourage third-party participants from 
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―best practices‖ approach to analyzing and speaking about the relationships 
that are formed.  This Article proposes that when making decisions in 
shelter transactions involving third-party relationships, courts should 
explicitly recognize the ultimate indeterminacy of any transaction or 
relationship, whether between unrelated parties or not. Courts can do this 
by treating the decisional matrix confronting them as a choice between 
which of two diametrically opposite analytical possibilities is more 
apposite.  For example, a judicial intuition that a transaction occurred at 
arm‘s length should only be allowed to hold sway after a corresponding 
determination that the parties did not collude in setting prices and did not 
have the incentive to do so.  Likewise, a judicial determination that a 
transaction with a third party reflects the existence of genuine obligations 
should only be made after a clear determination that there are no unwritten 
understandings that undercut the existence of such economic effects. 
In other words, this Article suggests that courts should make 
determinations regarding relationships and transactions between taxpayers 
and third parties by employing an explicitly expressed oppositional-choice 
process.  Such a process would involve a court asking a list of ―back-and 
forth‖ questions in determining the true substance of a relationship and 
making its decision.  The questions asked should be organic, tailored to the 
specific situation presented, and adjusted to accommodate the changing 
realities of the shelter market.  For example, the analysis could look like 
this: 
Legitimizing: 
Is this a genuine transaction between multiple parties that 
are unrelated? 
Detractive: 
If there are third parties involved in the transaction, do they 
merely serve as straws or mules to give the transaction a 
credible flavor? 
Legitimizing: 
Do the transactions, relationships, and agreements between 
the taxpayer and the third party reflect the existence of 
genuine obligations that have economic effects? 
Detractive: 
Are the legal obligations or economic effects we think we 
observe undercut by unwritten understandings or side 
agreements that may not be obvious to the observer? 
  
 
engaging in abusive tax planning transactions.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 4965 (2006) (imposing an 
excise tax on certain tax-exempt entities entering into prohibited shelter transactions); I.R.C. 
§ 6652(c) (2006) (imposing penalties on tax-exempt entity for failure to disclose 
participation in certain prohibited transactions). 
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Legitimizing: 
Did the transactions, relationships, and agreements 
between the parties result in a shifting in benefits and 
burdens of ownership, and does the new owner take on 
risk? 
Detractive: 
Is there any evidence of countervailing factors (such as 
offsetting transactions) that undercut burden shifting or 
eliminate the risks of ownerships? 
Legitimizing: 
Was the pricing of the transaction at arm’s length and at 
fair value? 
Detractive: 
Is there evidence of collusion or price setting between the 
parties?  Is there any suggestion that pricing was set to 
achieve a certain level of tax benefits? 
Legitimizing: 
Were the agreements and prior relationships between 
taxpayer and third party transparently presented, readily 
accessible, and observable to the administrative and/or 
judicial fact finder? 
Detractive: 
Do the taxpayer and third-party players have an incentive 
to misrepresent, hide, or withhold information from the 
judicial fact finder, such that we should look at the facts 
presented to us with a suspicious eye? 
In this manner, making a realistic determination of the true nature or 
the real economics of a third party‘s participation would require judges to 
overcome increasing transactional complexity and existing presumptions of 
respect toward unrelated party transactions.  They would also need to 
perform a considered analysis of the underlying historic and continuing 
commercial, business, or personal relationships and transactions between 
the taxpayer and third parties, and to come to an in-depth understanding of 
what behaviors are incentivized by these relationships.  In doing so, the 
analysis deliberately takes on an implicit forward and backward looking 
dimension. 
The process and results of the above oppositional-choice analysis 
should be made an explicit part of judicial opinions by introducing a 
mandatory new section as part of the factual description provided in the 
opinion text.  This notion of modifying judicial opinion format is not new 
and has been suggested elsewhere.
219
  The notion is also not outrageous.  
 
 219. See Oldfather, supra note 217, at 748, 794-801 (arguing that format of judicial 
opinions should be modified to include ―‗framing arguments‘–party-generated statements of 
the issues before the court‖ in order to facilitate better regulation of judicial behavior). 
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After all, judges already customarily included certain sections in their 
opinion—such sections most often include a summary of prior proceedings, 
a summary of the facts, a statement of the legal issue, a summary of the 
applicable doctrine, and the like.  Making a slight change in opinion format 
and coverage in order to facilitate more thorough fact finding on a critical 
matter should not be difficult or controversial. 
It should be noted that the last two ―oppositions‖ in the oppositional-
choice analysis described above are of particular importance.  They extend 
the inquiry to the question of how underlying and hidden relationships 
affect transparency and disclosure in order to remedy the potential 
evidentiary imbalances discussed in Part IV.A.  As that Part points out, 
third-party relationships can have serious effects on these matters.
220
 
To sum things up, engaging in this back-and-forth analysis between 
legitimizing and detractive interpretations, and expressly including the 
process and results of such analysis in the opinion text, serves a number of 
purposes.
221
  First, it aids judicial analysis.  It forces courts to pay close 
attention to the relationships underlying a shelter transaction in the first 
place instead of being overly influenced by how a transaction (particularly 
a transaction between unrelated parties) is papered and presented, giving 
courts a better chance not to be led astray by one-sided accounts and 
information asymmetries.
222
  It also gives courts a better chance of 
understanding how the ongoing nature of some relationships may impact 
the determination of whether a transaction has substance or is a sham.  
Balanced relationship analysis and the crafting of explicit expository 
opinions by lower courts also aids appellate review, providing appeals 
courts with a more solid and transparent framework for understanding the 
relationships underlying appealed shelter cases.
223
  An oppositional-choice 
approach to relationship analysis is also useful because it mirrors the way 
in which evidence is discovered and introduced into the record in tax 
litigation.
224
  Typically, the taxpayer (and third parties in the taxpayer‘s 
 
 220. See supra Part IV.A. 
 221. Some of the goals, purposes, and functions of judicial explication are explored in 
related literature concerning the roles and goals of judicial opinion writing.  See Bandes, 
supra note 217, at 281 (―[J]udicial narratives are under tremendous pressure to be 
hegemonic.‖); Oldfather, supra note 217, at 795 (―Conceiving of opinions as a form of 
informational regulation both invites and facilitates consideration of how the opinion device 
might be modified to direct judicial behavior.‖); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results 
and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371 (1995) (discussing 
reasons for, constraints on, principles underlying, and techniques associated with judicial 
writing). 
 222. Wolfman, supra note 94, at 1076. 
 223. My thanks to Jason Reichlyn for highlighting this point. 
 224. See generally TAX CT. R. PRAC. P. 70-104 (2010) (discovery rules generally 
applicable to proceedings of the United States Tax Court).  See also I.R.C. § 7453 (2006); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26-53 (discovery and trial rules generally applicable in the federal district 
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corner) will endeavor to put forth the most legitimizing spin possible on the 
record and the IRS will introduce maximally detractive interpretations of 
the same transaction.
225
  Courts are left with the difficult task of sorting out 
the conflicting relationship depictions of already complex transactions that 
each side tries to present.  By engaging in an oppositional-choice analysis, 
courts will be better able to appreciate and evaluate the existence, strength, 
and veracity of the arguments and counterarguments put forth by the 
parties, instead of being unduly swayed by the point of view put forward by 
one side. 
In addition, such an approach has the potential to change the behavior 
of players even in times leading up to a tax trial.  If the parties to a tax case 
(i.e., taxpayer, third parties, and IRS) know that courts will always be 
looking deeply and in an analytically oppositional way at the content of 
third-party relationships, this can have the effect of encouraging more 
robust discovery and disclosure at the administrative and trial level, thereby 
ameliorating some of the transparency and observability problems pointed 
out in this Article.  For example, this could encourage more aggressive and 
thorough subpoenaing and questioning of counterparties in tax cases, which 
could, in turn, have the effect of discouraging potential counterparties from 
―helping out‖ in transactions that lack substance in the first place.  And, if 
parties are aware, ex ante, that courts will be exploring a broad range of 
analytical possibilities with respect to the relationships before them (not 
just the narrow economic effects of the present transaction), this may even 
have the effect of imposing costs that serve to discourage third parties from 
entering into the most aggressive kinds of relationship formation to begin 
with. 
Finally, adopting an oppositional choice analysis that is explicitly 
expressed in judicial opinions has the effect of harnessing judicial decision-
making as a tool for educating the public and raising awareness about the 
nature and extent of underlying relationships between taxpayers and third 
parties and their significance in facilitating shelter transactions.  As 
previously noted, a problem with observing relationship formation and 
transactions between parties in the commercial context in general, and in 
the tax shelter context in particular, is the hidden nature, complexity, and 
non-intuitiveness of the (non-human) legal personages, contracts, and the 
relationships that arise between them.
226
  This concealment and complexity 
 
courts). 
 225. See Wolfman, supra note 94, at 1075 (describing the Supreme Court‘s reliance in 
tax cases ―on the validity of a basic assumption of the adversary process:  that strong and 
effective advocates bring the issues into focus and marshal the strongest arguments for each 
side, thus educating the Court and helping it reach the best result‖).  As noted, this adversary 
process is often, in fact, fraught with information and power asymmetries.  See supra notes 
160, 172 and accompanying text. 
 226. See, e.g., Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. 
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is particularly stark as compared to the more ―obvious‖ interactions 
between easily observable human persons.  Indeed, the question about the 
proper relationship that should exist between the human and non-human 
legal persons (and the proper treatment of each) is arguably one of the 
important questions of our time.
227
  The problems of concealment and non-
intuitiveness are often exacerbated by information and other asymmetries 
between the taxing authority (and the public) and the sophisticated taxpayer 
in the tax litigation context.
228
  If the idea is to prevent abusive tax 
planning, then stimulating public, judicial, administrative, and legislative 
awareness about the underlying complex commercial relationships that so 
often facilitate such planning can only be a good thing. 
Judicial adoption of an oppositional choice analysis of third-party 
relationships will help achieve all three of the stated goals.  A judicial 
solution is required because judges are in the best position to facilitate 
narratives and explanations of the relationships between parties and to raise 
awareness about the effects of relationality in shelter transactions.  Because 
the significance of third-party relationships extends beyond the traditional 
economic substance assessment and encompasses issues of evidentiary 
transparency, behavioral incentives, and the need for raising awareness, a 
statutory or regulatory solution by itself is insufficient. 
Yet the question remains:  should judges in tax cases be charged with 
making in-depth evaluations of the business and commercial relationships 
between third parties?  On the one hand, given the importance of third-
party relationships in affecting the timing, amount, and location of tax 
benefit realization, it is hard to see why not.  Arguably, analyzing the 
merits of a claimed relationship is precisely what courts are doing in 
situations where they apply so-called ―factors‖ tests.
229
  On the other hand, 
there are contravening administrative and philosophical considerations.  
Probing the nuances of underlying relationships can be labor-intensive, 
time consuming, and an ill-suited use of scarce judicial expertise and 
 
BANKR. L.J.  253 (2009) (arguing that the erosion of the ―doctrine of secret liens‖ led to an 
―opaque credit environment‖ that contributed to the financial crisis of 2008). 
 227. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) 
(protecting political spending by unions and corporations as free speech under the First 
Amendment). 
 228. See Rostain, supra note 72, at 83-95 (describing role of private tax bar in growth of 
tax shelters); Schizer, supra note 172, at 331 (noting that tax shelters ―also derive from a 
structural imbalance in our tax system‖ whereby ―the private tax bar outmatches its 
counterpart in government‖); Wolfman, supra note 94, at 1076 (noting that, in the Frank 
Lyon litigation, ―[t]he weakness of government counsel was no match for the strength of 
taxpayer counsel‖ and urging ―serious reconsideration‖ to the ―assumptions‖ of the 
―adversary system‖ and ―process‖). 
 229. See Levine v. Comm‟r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2005-86 (2005) (applying factors test in 
determining whether taxpayer was common law employee or independent contractor, for 
purposes of determining deductibility of pension play contribution). 
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resources.
230
  Underlying relationships that extend beyond the transaction at 
issue may also be difficult to discern based on the record, which would 
most likely be focused on the discrete tax avoidance transaction being 
litigated.  And, ultimately, probing the underlying commercial relationships 
between the parties might require too much independent judicial 
investigation.  The question of how thoroughly judges should look into the 
underlying relationships between third parties also raises philosophical 
issues:  ultimately, this question implicates the broader issue of how 
closely, and in what circumstances, courts should scrutinize and intervene 
in contracts between the parties to a private transaction at all.
231
  This is 
hardly a question limited to tax law adjudication.
232
 
Despite these countervailing considerations, however, this Article 
contends that judges in tax cases absolutely should inquire more explicitly 
into the business and personal relationships between the taxpayer and the 
third party.  Tax law is fundamentally concerned with probing the true 
economics and substance of transactions rather than accepting their form at 
face value,
233
 and tax shelters raise serious problems of social justice in that 
they thwart attempts to raise revenue and create revenue leakage.
234
  Insofar 
as we want to discourage the formation of sham relationships acceptable in 
form but lacking substance, this overriding concern with substance—a 
 
 230. See generally Oldfather, supra note 217, at 768-79 (discussing the ―crisis of 
volume‖ affecting federal appellate courts and the effects on court performance); Stephen 
Reinhardt, Whose Federal Judiciary is it Anyway?, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (1993) (arguing 
for increase in size of judiciary); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, 
Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL 
L. REV. 273, 277 (1996) (arguing that size of judiciary needs to be increased to cope with 
effects of increasing caseloads). 
 231. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (ruling that New York statute 
―interferes with the right of contract between the employer and employees, concerning the 
number of hours in which the latter may labor in the bakery of the employer‖).  See also 
Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner‟s Shadow: Toward a Coherent Jurisprudence of 
Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 333-42 (1995) (describing ―the pattern of 
reinvigoration and retreat‖ in Supreme Court‘s economic rights jurisprudence); David A. 
Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 375 (2003) (criticizing the 
Lochner court for ―treat[ing] freedom of contract as a cornerstone of the constitutional order 
and systematically undervalued reasons for limiting or overriding the right‖). 
 232. See In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278, 285-86 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) 
(determining that securitized receivables were part of debtor‘s estate; rejecting 
characterization of attempted securitization transaction as a ―true sale‖).  See generally 
Robert A. Fogelson, Toward a Rational Treatment of Fraudulent Conveyance Cases 
Involving Leveraged Buyouts, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 552, 554 (1993) (arguing that ―since the 
judicial inquiry employed in constructive fraudulent conveyance/LBO cases is driven as 
much by equity as by law, bankruptcy courts should be free to fashion a creative equitable 
remedy in order to better balance the competing interests of lenders and unsecured 
creditors‖). 
 233. See supra Part III.A (describing doctrines that do this). 
 234. See supra note 5. 
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concern central to tax analysis—more than offsets philosophical concerns 
surrounding the freedom to contract.  In fact, the underlying assumption 
that contracts between the unrelated parties to a market transaction are 
somehow worthier of respect by their very nature is exactly the type of 
assumption that should be interrogated with the deep and explicit analysis 
suggested by this Article. 
B. A Necessary Rehabilitation of the Business Purpose Doctrine 
In addition to adopting an explicitly oppositional-choice analysis, the 
evaluation of business purpose as part of judicial anti-abuse analysis needs 
to be reconsidered.  As shown in Part IV.B, the application of the business 
purpose prong of the economic substance doctrine has been inconsistently 
developed and applied with respect to third parties.  The confusion in third-
party jurisprudence is of particular significance in situations where the 
taxpayer lacks a valid business purpose but is seeking to ―bootstrap‖ the 
business purpose of the third party in order to satisfy the requirement.
235
  
And the roles that third-party business purposes play are especially 
inchoate in the context of pass-through entities or ventures, or in 
evaluations of whether an entity, rather than a transaction, is a sham.
236
 
The rehabilitation recommended by this Article has two aspects:  first, 
courts should clarify that the only situations in which the business 
motivations of a third party can possibly be bootstrapped are situations 
where the third party is actually prevented by law or by regulation from 
conducting the transaction in the non-abusive way suggested by the court.  
Second, in situations involving relationships entered into through pass-
through entities, courts need to adopt a realistic view of which legal person 
is the taxpayer.  That is, in determining whose business purposes to 
―count,‖ the deciding factor is not whose name is on the pleading (or who 
―owns‖ the entity listed) but rather whose tax liability is ultimately being 
minimized.  Both of these aspects of the proposed doctrinal rehabilitation 
 
 235. Situations where the taxpayer concededly possesses a business purpose but a third-
party participant in the transaction lacks a business purpose also raise interesting questions.  
Recent scholarship has focused on the effects of how ―the transaction‖ is framed.  This 
scholarship argues that the framing of a transaction as either broadly or narrowly defined 
has the capacity to affect a finding of economic substance or business purpose.  See Hariton, 
supra note 124.  See also Gray Jennings, Economic Substance and the Taxpayer‟s Purpose, 
127 TAX NOTES 535, 537 (2010) (suggesting that ―the common law of economic substance 
be framed so that a step has economic substance if the taxpayer‘s purpose for the step is to 
contribute to realizing a nontax objective of the taxpayer‖).  Along these lines, in situations 
where, as a threshold matter, the taxpayer is initially thought to have a business purpose but 
the third party does not, re-framing the transaction to include only the part of the transaction 
designed to minimize taxes may lead to an outcome in which neither the taxpayer nor the 
third party is found to have a non-tax business purpose. 
 236. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
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must take place in dialogue with the changes to the economic substance 
doctrine resulting from its recent codification by the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010.
237
 
1. Adoption of an ―Actual Prevention‖ Standard 
Should bootstrapping of third-party business purpose be permitted to 
salvage transactions where the taxpayer lacks a business purpose?  This is 
apparently permissible under the logic of Frank Lyon.
238
  However, the 
recent and much-debated
239
 codification of the economic substance doctrine 
has arguably rendered such bootstrapping impermissible.
240
  New § 
7701(o), which is titled a ―[c]larification of [the] economic substance 
doctrine,‖ contains the following general rule: 
(1) Application of doctrine.  In the case of any transaction to 
which the economic substance doctrine is relevant, such 
transaction shall be treated as having economic substance only 
if— 
(A) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from 
Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer's economic 
position, and 
(B) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from 
Federal income tax effects) for entering into such 
transaction.
241
 
The term ―transaction‖ is defined to include ―a series of 
transactions.‖
242
  However, the term ―taxpayer‖ is not defined by statute.  
At first blush, the wording of Code Section 7701(o)(1)(B) suggests that the 
focus of the business purpose analysis should be on whether ―the taxpayer‖ 
 
 237. See Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1067-68 (2010) (applying to 
transactions entered into after March 30, 2010). 
 238. See Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 576 (suggesting that the taxpayer need not be 
motivated by non-tax considerations as long as the other party to the agreement is so 
motivated).  See also Newman, 902 F.2d at 163 (applying the reasoning in Frank Lyon in 
taking third-party motivations into account). 
 239. See Jeremiah Coder, News Analysis: Will Economic Substance Codification Be 
Worth It?, 127 TAX NOTES 16 (Apr. 5, 2010) (discussing practitioners‘ criticisms of the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010); Jeremiah Coder, Panelists Divided 
on Effects of Economic Substance Codification, 127 TAX NOTES 252 (Apr. 19, 2010) 
(summarizing some practitioners‘ differing thoughts on the effects of the codification of 
economic substance in the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010); Monte 
Jackel, Dawn of a New Era: Congress Codifies Economic Substance, 127 TAX NOTES 289 
(Apr. 19, 2010) (discussing the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 and 
identifying several areas in which guidance is needed); Jennings, supra note 235. 
 240. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act § 1409(a), 124 Stat. at 1067-68 
(applying to transactions entered into after March 30, 2010). 
 241. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o)(1) (West 2010). 
 242. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o)(5)(D) (West 2010). 
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has a ―substantial purpose‖ for engaging in the transaction, and that the 
analysis should therefore not take into account the motivations of third 
parties.  However, this formulation may merely beg the follow-up question:  
does helping a third party fulfill a non-tax business purpose in a way that 
happens to yield favorable tax consequences for the taxpayer/helper 
constitute a ―substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects)‖ 
of the taxpayer/helper for purposes of Code Section 7701(o)(1)(B)?  The 
answer is not clear and probably will not be clear until such a fact pattern 
actually comes before the courts.
243
 
In light of this uncertainty, this Article proposes a simple threshold 
rule:  since adverse judicial decisions in tax shelter cases amount to 
denying one set of claimed tax results and reallocating tax items in 
accordance with the ―true substance‖ of the transaction, the third party‘s 
business purposes should only be considered if the third party is actually 
prevented by legal or regulatory requirements from entering into the ―true 
substance‖ transaction suggested or envisioned by the court. 
Frank Lyon would arguably satisfy this standard:  in Frank Lyon, the 
tax transaction was a sale-leaseback transaction, but the Eighth Circuit 
ruled that the benefits and burdens taken on by the taxpayer were ―too 
insubstantial‖ to cause taxpayer to be the true owner of the bank 
building.
244
  Logically, the ―true substance‖ of the transaction was that the 
bank owned the building.  However, the bank was ―actually prevented‖ by 
Arkansas law from owning the building.
245
  Under the proposed rule, the 
bank‘s business purposes could be considered.  Newman, on the other hand, 
would not satisfy the test because the non-tax business purposes motivating 
the trucking company consisted merely of ―financial reasons‖ and a 
concern with making ―the best decision for [the] company‖ and these 
―financial reasons‖ basically amounted to a mere business preference to 
leave the trucks at issue off of the trucking company‘s balance sheet.
246
  
The mere business preference in Newman is distinguishable from the 
express disallowance by state and federal laws and regulations in Frank 
Lyon.
247
 
This Article does not suggest that a legitimate non-tax business 
purpose exists under § 7701(o) in every case in which a taxpayer has no 
non-tax business purposes but is assisting a third party that is being 
thwarted by legal or regulatory constraints.  Some such situations may still 
be found to fail the business purpose requirement, depending on the facts 
 
 243. Cf. ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d at 514 n.6 (―[T]he desire to aid another party in tax 
avoidance is no more a business purpose than actually engaging in tax avoidance.‖). 
 244. Frank Lyon, 536 F.3d at 754, rev‟d 435 U.S. 561. 
 245. Id. at 563-64. 
 246. Newman, 902 F.2d at 163. 
 247. Compare Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 563-64, with Newman, 902 F.2d at 163. 
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and circumstances surrounding the transaction.
248
  The standard proposed 
by this Article is, rather, a threshold requirement, albeit a high one.  
However, a high standard is appropriate because situations where the 
taxpayer does not have a business purpose and is seeking to ―latch on‖ to a 
third party‘s purposes in order to vindicate a transaction already represent a 
marginal case.  A rule that accepts the mere fact of third-party business 
preferences as sufficient to endow such substance would open the door to 
jurisprudential uncertainty and taxpayer abuses. 
2. A Realistic Approach to Relationships Via Pass-Through Entities 
In addition to setting a high bar for determining which third-party 
business purposes suffice, courts also need to formulate a more consistent 
and nuanced analysis of whose business purposes ―count‖  in the context of 
relationships intermediated through pass-through entity taxpayers.  In other 
words, courts should seek a consistent answer to the question, ―Who is the 
taxpayer?‖ for purposes of applying the business purpose inquiry to pass-
through entities. 
In this regard, it should be noted that the recent codification of the 
economic substance doctrine does not help answer the ―Who is the 
taxpayer?‖ question.
249
  As discussed, the ―business purpose‖ prong of the 
new provision requires that ―the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart 
from Federal income tax effects) for entering into such transaction‖ in 
order for the transaction to have substance, and the term ―taxpayer‖ is not 
defined in the statute.
250
  Therefore, in situations where ―the taxpayer‖ is a 
pass-through entity such as a partnership, it is still an open question 
whether the existence of a business purpose should be determined at the 
entity level or on the partner/member level on a look-through basis. 
This Article argues that ―the taxpayer‖ should be read in a 
commonsense way to mean the party that ultimately is seeking to minimize 
its tax liability or to utilize the tax benefit, whether or not such goal is 
accomplished through a pass-through entity (or chains of pass-through 
entities).  Correspondingly, the party listed on the litigation pleading or the 
case name is not necessarily ―the taxpayer‖ for purposes of the business 
purpose inquiry.  Other members or partners of the listed party should be 
considered ―third parties,‖ rather than taxpayers, for purposes of the 
 
 248. For example, this would be the case if the third party satisfies the ―actual 
prevention‖ test but the transaction lacks economic substance; or, for example, if it is found 
that satisfaction of the ―actual prevention‖ was specifically engineered by the taxpayer. 
 249. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 
1409(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1067-68 (2010) (applying to transactions entered into after March 
30, 2010). 
 250. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o)(1)(B) (West 2010) (emphasis added); see supra text 
accompanying notes 240-243. 
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analysis. 
For example, in ACM Partnership, the entity named as the taxpayer in 
the litigation was the partnership (the pass-through entity) itself.
251
  The 
partners in that partnership were the corporate parent entity seeking to 
offset its capital losses, the facilitating third-party foreign bank, and a 
subsidiary of the promoter, Merrill Lynch.
252
  The fact that the partnership 
was the named taxpayer gave rise to confusion with respect to whose 
business purposes deserved attention, particularly in cases where a ―sham 
entity‖ (rather than a ―sham transaction‖) analysis was applied.  The 
application of a ―sham entity‖ analysis in some of those cases in effect 
provided the courts with a pathway to looking at the intentions of both of 
the partnership‘s partners in assessing the existence of a business purpose, 
rather than focusing, as it should have, on the party seeking the favorable 
tax consequences.
253
  Under the standard proposed in this Article, ―the 
taxpayer‖ would in all circumstances be considered to be the U.S. corporate 
partner seeking to minimize tax liability, while the facilitating tax-
indifferent foreign bank would be considered a third party. 
It might be argued that looking at the third party‘s business purposes 
in the pass-through context is justified.  After all, in entering into a partner 
relationship with the tax avoider, the third party in some sense becomes 
―less unrelated‖ to the tax avoider than before.  If the partnership is a bona 
fide partnership, then perhaps taking the third-party partner‘s business 
purposes into account is justified.  However, framing the issue this way is 
circular logic—this approach allows the question of whether a partnership 
is a ―sham entity‖ to be answered, in part, based on the motivations of the 
third-party partners.  Nevertheless, whether the third party is a true partner 
(and hence whether its motivations should be considered in the first place) 
fundamentally depends on the bona fides of the partnership relationship.  In 
other words, deciding in advance to allow bootstrapping of the third-party 
participant‘s business purposes in effect begs the question that the business 
purpose inquiry is supposed to answer.  Because of this circularity, it is 
clear that looking to a third party‘s business purpose in the pass-through 
context is not a solid and independent enough analytical ground upon 
which to construct a consistent judicial anti-abuse approach.  The question 
of how much (or whether) to treat a third-party partner‘s business purpose 
as no different from the taxpayer entity‘s business purpose should really be 
treated as a secondary and dependent decisional node, one that is 
contingent upon a separate initial assessment of whether the partnership 
relationship at issue is a sham. 
The approach proposed by this Article accords with common sense 
 
 251. ACM P‟ship, 157 F.3d 231. 
 252. Id. at 233-39. 
 253. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2. 
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and realism, and is the correct one for two reasons.  First, the alternative 
approach (i.e., allowing third-party business motivations to be considered 
by looking through the pass-through entity) attaches undue weight upon the 
judicial determination of whether to apply the sham entity or the sham 
transaction doctrine, or some other anti-abuse doctrine.  That is, a judicial 
choice to apply a sham entity analysis effectively opens the door wide to 
crediting third-party partner business purposes by providing judges with 
more cover to do so, whereas a choice to apply a different type of analysis 
tends not to have that effect.  The fundamental purpose of applying the 
judicial anti-abuse doctrines should be to probe deeply and consistently the 
economic realities surrounding a tax motivated transaction.
254
  Applying an 
anti-abuse jurisprudence that privileges third-party business purposes to a 
greater or lesser extent based on which sham analysis is applied (and that 
does not realize the consequences of its approach) defeats this overarching 
purpose. 
Second, the approach of allowing partner-level business purposes to 
―count‖ also places too much weight on the question of which entity gets 
named as the taxpayer-petitioner in litigation.  This determination is 
dependent, in part, on which entity‘s tax return the IRS has examined in the 
administrative proceedings below, which is in turn dependent on the 
structure of substantive and compliance-related tax law (which may not 
have been formulated with this particular issue in mind).
255
  For example, 
the Code‘s rules for examination of partnership returns generally require a 
partnership-level determination of the partnership‘s tax items (income, loss, 
deductions, credits, etc.) for the sake of administrative convenience.
256
  
These rules were adopted by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act 
of 1982 (―TEFRA‖) in order to address the administrative and logistical 
problems associated with separate examinations of each partner‘s returns.
257
  
Once the partnership-level determination has been made, each partner uses 
that partnership-level determination in computing that partner‘s separate 
 
 254. See, e.g., Santa Monica, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1190 (describing the judicial anti-
abuse doctrines as ―particularized judicial doctrines‖ that were ―developed‖ by courts ―[i]n 
applying . . . general legal principles‖ of examining substance and statutory intent); see also 
United States v. Ingredient Tech. Corp., 698 F.2d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 1983) (―[I]t is immaterial 
whether we are talking about ‗substantial economic reality,‘ ‗substance over form,‘ ‗sham‘ 
transactions, or the like; rather the question is whether under the statute and regulations here 
involved the transaction affects a beneficial interest other than the reduction of taxes.‖ 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 255. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PARTNERSHIP AUDIT TECHNIQUE GUIDE (2002), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/businesses/partnerships/article/0,,id=134688,00.html. 
 256. I.R.C. § 6221–34 (2006) and accompanying Treasury Regulations; see also 
MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 8.17 (2009) 
(describing partnership examination procedures). 
 257. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified as I.R.C. §§ 6221-6234 (2006)). 
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tax liability.
258
  So, for example, if the IRS examined the return of a 
corporate taxpayer (C) and the corporate taxpayer was a partner in a 
partnership (P), the IRS would generally need to make adjustments to the 
P‘s information return under the TEFRA rules in order for those 
partnership items to eventually ―hit‖ C‘s tax return.  In a subsequent 
litigation, the named petitioner would then be P, even though the ultimate 
adjustment sought is to C‘s tax picture.
259
 
It is not clear that courts (particularly non-specialist courts) are aware 
of the effects of technical rules (such as the TEFRA rules) and other 
structural features of IRS administrative proceedings on the broader 
outcomes of later tax controversy proceedings, including tax shelter cases.  
This is problematic.  If judges adopt a jurisprudence that accords weight to 
a third-party partner‘s business purpose just because the petitioner in 
litigation is the pass-through entity (as opposed to the entity ultimately 
seeking to enjoy the tax benefit), this would amount to even greater weight 
being put on the rules governing audits and examinations of returns.  This 
early-stage administrative or congressional decision (which may be based 
on rules enacted to meet completely unrelated policy goals)
260
 would then 
have the effect of hamstringing the Treasury or Department of Justice in 
later litigation by unintentionally transforming a third-party participant into 
a party ―related‖ to the taxpayer.  This certainly was not the intention of 
procedural rules such as the TEFRA rules.
261
 
In sum, for purposes of applying the business purpose analysis, courts 
should apply the commonsense guiding principle that the taxpayer—the 
legal person whose business purposes should ―count‖—is the entity seeking 
to minimize its tax liability.  The relevant question is not which party‘s 
name is on the pleading but rather which party is ultimately seeking the tax 
benefit of the transaction.  The party who ultimately reaps the tax benefits 
should be the party whose business purposes are analyzed front and center.  
Other entities or facilitating partners are in effect third-party facilitators for 
purposes of the business purpose analysis.  Their motivations should only 
be taken into account in the narrow set of circumstances outlined in Part 
V.B.1 above (i.e., where the substance suggested by the court is actually 
prevented from occurring by legal or regulatory requirements).  Such an 
approach is particularly critical in an environment where chains of entities 
and parties may be used in effectuating a tax avoidance transaction. 
 
 258. I.R.C. § 6222; see also SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 256, ¶ 8.17 (describing the 
―unified administrative and judicial proceeding‖ created by TEFRA). 
 259. E.g., ACM P‟ship, 157 F.3d 231. 
 260. The TEFRA rules were most likely not enacted with impacts on judicial anti-abuse 
doctrines in mind.  See Section of Taxation Proposal as to Audit of Partnerships, 32 TAX 
LAW. 551 (1979). 
 261. Id. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The relational character of tax planning has important impacts on the 
structure and outcome of tax shelter litigation beyond the question of 
whether a transaction has economic substance.  Tax law‘s traditional 
focus—through long-standing anti-abuse doctrines—on assessing the risk 
or economic substance of a tax transaction is inadequate in managing the 
full extent and impacts of the complex commercial and personal 
relationships that underlie tax shelter transactions.  We are just starting to 
grapple with the full effects of such relationships in facilitating tax 
evasion.
262
  This Article has summarized the things we know and do so far, 
described why these concepts and measures are inadequate, raised 
additional concerns about relationality, and suggested some avenues for 
reform. 
First, this Article discussed the inadequacies of the traditional anti-
abuse analyses in probing the bona fides of a tax transaction, arguing that 
courts have encountered difficulties for three primary reasons:  (1)  the 
fundamentally indeterminate character of third-party relationships, (2) 
certain features of tax doctrine that facilitate complexity and that suggest a 
presumption of respect toward unrelated party transactions, and (3) the 
inherent artificiality and limitations of the doctrines being applied.  It 
therefore argued that more explicit and consistent judicial evaluations of 
and discussions about such relationships are required.  In addition, this 
Article has pointed out two other important impacts that relationships with 
third parties have in shaping tax shelter litigation:  (1) adverse impacts on 
evidentiary transparency and observability in tax trial proceedings, and (2) 
obfuscatory impacts and warping of the content and application of 
substantive doctrine. 
To remedy these problems, this Article has offered two normative 
proposals designed to change judicial and taxpayer behavior:  (1) judicial 
application of a clearly and rigorously implemented and explicitly 
discussed ―oppositional-choice‖ analysis, and (2) judicial rehabilitation of 
the business purpose doctrine from the confusion caused by the 
complexities of taxpayer relationality by applying the doctrine in a 
common-sense way.  Adoption of these proposals will encourage more 
accurate judicial determinations of when and whether to respect 
relationships between taxpayers and third parties, help raise public 
consciousness about the detrimental effects of relationship formation in the 
shelter context, discourage taxpayers from engaging in aggressive 
relationship formation, and help preserve and encourage proper application 
 
 262. See GAO REPORT ON NETWORK TAX EVASION, supra note 10 (September 2010 
report discussing effects of networks of related entities in facilitating tax evasion and 
discussing barriers that IRS faces in coping with this ―network tax evasion‖). 
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of long-standing judicial doctrines in the face of constantly changing and 
ever more complex transactions and relationships between persons. 
Understanding, describing, and circumscribing the full extent and 
impact of the relationality that underlies aggressive tax planning—beyond 
the mere application of current substantive doctrine—is tremendously 
important.  Discourses that emphasize the content of our substantive tax 
rules as discrete phenomena have too long been privileged over discourses 
analyzing the underlying relationships that facilitate the use and abuse of 
these rules.  Furthermore, underlying assumptions that we bring to the table 
may lull us into believing that we are aware of these relationships and are 
adequately considering and assessing their impacts.  Unfortunately, the 
opposite is true.  Since relationships between legal persons are the ―life 
blood‖ that allows tax consequence-generating transactions to occur at all, 
it is imperative that such relationships—and our present approaches toward 
them—be confronted and interrogated in full. 
